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ABSTRACT
This article draws on original historical research, queer theory,
communitarian philosophy, and an array of anthropological sources to
suggest that efforts by Western liberals to protect practitioners of
same-sex intimate conduct in Africa may be relatively unsuccessful
and could further endanger the intended beneficiaries of advocacy.
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In recent years, Western human rights activists, scholars, and
politicians have worked to advance homosexual rights in Africa.
Understandably, they have tended to frame their arguments in liberal,
universalist terms. Given the successful reliance on liberal values of
equality and autonomy to enhance the status of homosexuals in the
West, this approach is intuitive. Liberal ideology has also become
fully entrenched in international law, and the language of
constitutions of countries across Africa reflects the influence of
liberal philosophy. Nonetheless, numerous African leaders have
responded to liberal appeals with hostility, and often with claims that
homosexuality is un-African, a disease of the morally corrupt West.
I am sympathetic to the liberal perspective, but consideration of
ideas outside the liberal paradigm suggests reasons for caution in
pursuing a liberal agenda to promote the well-being of people who
engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa. Some of the anthropological
evidence about the social significance of same-sex sexual intimacy in
African cultures reinforces the claims of queer theorists, whose antiessentialist arguments suggest that sexual identity is socially
constructed, rather than the product of an immutable, biological
imperative. In many African cultures, both historically and today,
people who have engaged in same-sex intimacies have considered
that behavior an insignificant component of their personal and sexual
identities. Furthermore, in many societies, same-sex intimacy has
been primarily socially contingent, rather than a stable feature of the
lives of people who engage in such conduct. This suggests obstacles
for liberal nondiscrimination arguments. Likewise, the observation of
queer theorists that essentialist claims can be used as effectively as
tools of oppression as of liberation provides reason for caution;
tyrannical majorities have frequently used the idea of fundamental,
immutable difference as a means of subjugating disfavored
minorities. In the end, categorizing all Africans who engage in samesex intimacies as homosexuals may make the intended beneficiaries
of such categorization easier targets for majorities in societies
disinclined to accept Western conceptions of sexual identity.
Communitarian philosophy is also relevant to any discussion of the
legal status of homosexuality in Africa because of the deep
communitarian roots of traditional cultures across the continent.
Although African countries have tended to adopt constitutions that
proclaim liberal rights, many of the societies in which those
constitutions have arisen have lacked the West’s profound cultural
commitment to individualism. Instead, a broad range of African
cultures have tended to emphasize group welfare and individual
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responsibilities over individual rights. As a consequence,
communitarian values have frequently explained the actual operation
of law in African countries better than the putative liberal loyalties
evinced in African constitutions. This communitarian perspective also
suggests obstacles to advancement of homosexual rights in Africa
through liberal arguments.
Finally, a deeper appreciation of the sordid history of Western
imposition of universalizing ideals to manipulate and subjugate
African minds and bodies, and of Western denial of African agency,
might alert liberals to the treacherous intellectual territory they inhabit
and might help liberals avoid colonialist tropes that could further
inflame resistance to policies aimed at enhancement of the status of
people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa. Western liberals
are correct to counter African claims that homosexuality is un-African
by pointing out that European outsiders originally introduced
religious intolerance and sodomy laws to African cultures that had
been more amenable to same-sex intimacy. But African leaders who
insist on the Western origins of homosexuality are also correct,
though in an unintended sense: the presence in many contemporary
African cultures of some people who define their sexual identities in
terms congruous with Western conceptions of homosexuality may
indeed be the consequence of Western influence. Additionally, even
though there are now some Africans who consider themselves
homosexuals, advocacy by Western rights advocates and threats by
Western governments might cause backlash that could make their
lives worse. Ultimately, if liberals hope to have a positive impact on
the lives of Africans who engage in same-sex intimacies, we should
structure our interactions with the cultures we hope to influence as
conversations rather than as lectures or commands.
INTRODUCTION
A short film featured on The New York Times website in early 2013
addresses the ongoing struggle in Uganda over the legal status of
homosexuality, emphasizing the role American evangelicals have
played in funding and encouraging the Africans who have worked to
enact oppressive laws and policies and who have expressed intolerant,
bigoted views of homosexuals. The film, Gospel of Intolerance,1
offers a lucid counterpoint to the numerous, prominent assertions of

1 Roger Ross Williams, Gospel of Intolerance, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/opinion/gospel-of-intolerance.html?_r=0.
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African leaders that homosexuality is foreign to the African continent,
a Western construction, and a neocolonial imposition on traditional
African culture and values. In fact, the film suggests to its viewers,
American religious conservatives are the neocolonialists, using
Western money to shape the opinions of Africans to fit the
Westerners’ constricted, harmful views on morality and human
nature.
The movie’s observations are accurate enough, yet it is also true
that both the filmmaker and the American evangelicals reproduce
important features of imperialist discourse. With the self-conscious
extension of an American “culture war” to the African continent, both
the evangelicals and the filmmaker advocate universalizing norms of
Western origin, which each contingent argues should mold African
law and culture. The filmmaker, moreover, participates in a
longstanding colonialist tradition by denying agency to the majority
of Africans, and their leaders, who express anti-homosexual
sentiment. According to the implicit message of the film, the African
politicians who make vitriolic public attacks on homosexuality are
mere puppets of sinister outside forces, incapable of possessing their
own morally coherent perspective.
The direct claims of the evangelicals, and of many Africans, have a
deeply established pedigree, dating at least to eighteenth-century
accounts by explorers and missionaries who asserted that homosexual
conduct was essentially foreign to the African continent.2 At the
height of colonialism in Africa, in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, Victorian-era laws against homosexual conduct, applicable
in the colonies as in the metropole, reflected the period ideology that
heterosexuality was the natural norm, and that homosexuality was
both biologically and morally deviant.3 Contemporary rights
advocates assert their own universalizing rubric, derived from an
alternative European lineage: the liberal notion of universal human
rights to equal treatment and autonomy, dating to the Enlightenment
philosophy of John Locke. Liberal philosophy came to encompass
claims for the rights of homosexuals (a class Enlightenment
philosophers such as Locke would not have recognized or understood
in modern terms) only much later. Yet that philosophy now defines
the modern framework for human rights law, including assertions of
the rights of homosexuals, based on broader rights enumerated both in

2
3

See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.
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national constitutions and in international covenants.4 And just as
modern homosexual rights advocates suggest that Western
conservatives are the true source of anti-homosexual sentiment in
Africa, colonial Europeans (and their modern Western and African
intellectual counterparts) contended that homosexual activity in
Africa was the product of an external menace, at the time the morally
licentious Arabs and Portuguese of Burton’s infamous Sotadic Zone.5
Understandably, advocates for the normalization and protection of
homosexuality in Africa have tended to frame their arguments in
liberal, universalist terms. This approach is intuitive, given successful
reliance on liberal values of equality and autonomy to enhance the
status of homosexuals in the West. Moreover, liberal ideology has
become fully entrenched in international law, and the language of
constitutions of countries across Africa also reflects the influence of
liberal philosophy. I am sympathetic to the liberal perspective. I
believe, however, that Western lawyers, scholars, and human rights
activists who have considered the status of homosexuality in Africa
have given insufficient attention to ideas outside the liberal paradigm
that suggest reasons for caution in pursuing a liberal agenda to
improve the lives of people who engage in same-sex intimacies in
Africa.
In this article, I will contextualize liberal claims within the broader
anthropological and philosophical discourse on gay identity and gay
rights, including an overview of current and historical conceptions of
homosexual behavior and sexual identity in various African cultures. I
will discuss the ideology of queer theorists, whose anti-essentialist
arguments reinforce some of the anthropological evidence about the
significance of same-sex sexual intimacy in African societies.6
Although the anthropological record demonstrates geographically
widespread behavior that modern, Western observers would
characterize as homosexual, both current and historical
understandings of this behavior would frequently confound modern
constructions of homosexual identity.7 In fact, many Africans who
engage in what Westerners would term homosexual conduct consider
that conduct a relatively insignificant component not only of their
overall identities, but an unimportant component even of their sexual
See infra Part III.
MARC EPPRECHT, HUNGOCHANI: THE HISTORY OF A DISSIDENT SEXUALITY IN
SOUTHERN AFRICA 8 (2005).
6 See infra Part IV.B.
7 See infra Part V.
4
5
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identities.8 This anthropological substantiation of the anti-essentialist
arguments of queer theorists suggests significant obstacles for liberal
nondiscrimination arguments. Likewise, the observation of queer
theorists that essentialist arguments can be used as effectively as tools
of oppression as of liberation provides reason for caution by liberals
attempting to improve African lives by classifying them in Western,
essentialist terms.
I will also discuss communitarian philosophy and its relationship to
many African cultures. Communitarian arguments are particularly
salient in the context of any discussion of the legal status of
homosexuality in Africa because of the deep communitarian roots of
traditional cultures across the continent.9 Although African countries
have tended to adopt constitutions that proclaim liberal rights, many
of the societies in which those constitutions have arisen have lacked
the profound cultural commitment to individualism that observers like
Michael Sandel have noted in the United States.10 Instead, African
cultures have tended to emphasize group welfare over individual
rights.11 As a consequence, communitarian values have frequently
explained the actual operation of law in African countries better than
the putative liberal loyalties evinced in African constitutions.12 This
communitarian perspective also suggests obstacles to advancement of
homosexual rights in Africa through liberal arguments. Ultimately,
both communitarians and queer theorists deny the very existence of
rights as trumps transcending the values of the communities in which
such claims are made.
These contexts—the anti-essentialist claims of queer theorists, the
African anthropological record, and communitarian philosophy—may
be useful to liberal human rights activists; they suggest the likely
depth of political resistance to liberal initiatives, which homosexual
rights advocates must consider before designing strategies to improve
the lives of practitioners of same-sex intimacies in Africa. Similarly, a
more expansive appreciation of the historical forces and traditions
that have influenced African thought might alert liberals to the
Id.
See infra Part IV.A.
10 See generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY (1996) (hereinafter SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S
DISCONTENT); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS (2013) (describing the pervasive commodification of social goods in the United
States).
11 See infra Part IV.A.
12 Id.
8
9
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somewhat treacherous intellectual territory they inhabit. In advocating
for universal rights, liberals would do well to recognize the sordid
history of Western imposition of universalizing ideals to influence
and subjugate African minds and bodies. Such an appreciation might
facilitate avoidance of the tropes of colonialism that could further
inflame resistance to policies aimed at enhancement of the status of
people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa.
This discussion would be salient in a large number of cultures
outside of Africa as well. Traditional societies outside of Africa have
often emphasized group welfare over individual rights.13 Additionally,
patterns of same-sex sexual contact in societies outside of Africa have
frequently confounded Western conceptions of sexual identity.14
Despite these potentially broader implications, I have chosen to focus
on Africa, both because it coincides with my professional interests,
and because the African reaction to homosexuality has incurred
special attention from Western activists in recent years. This attention
has been due, in part, to the extremity of some legal responses to
homosexuality in Africa. It has, I believe, also been a consequence of
the extreme license Westerners have historically felt entitled to take in
attempting to influence African cultures to match Western ideals.
In Part II of this article, I will provide a brief overview of the legal
status of homosexuality in Africa and of responses to African laws by
liberal human rights advocates. In Part III, I will examine liberal legal
arguments for homosexual rights in Africa. Although there is an
13 See, e.g., Tonya Kowalski, The Forgotten Sovereigns, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 765,
n.198 (2009) (describing the Chthonic focus on human relationships in opposition to the
Western emphasis on individual property ownership over community rights); Eugene KB
Tan, ‘We’ v ‘I’: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 AUSTRL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2002);
Timothy Webster, China’s Human Rights Footprint in Africa, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 626, 634 (2013) (stating that, “[l]ike other Asian countries, China stresses
communitarian values, the importance of groups within society and the state’s interest over
those of the individual”).
14 As I will discuss below, even in the West, the modern sexual taxonomy, which
conceives of homosexuality as an immutable characteristic of personal and sexual identity,
did not arise until the latter half of the nineteenth century. See infra Part IV.B. For a broad
critique of efforts to universalize Western concepts of sexual orientation, see Sonia Katyal,
Exporting Identity, 14 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 97 (drawing heavily on examples from
Thailand and India and arguing that the incompatibility of Western notions of sexual
identity with ideas about same-sex intimacy in non-Western cultures suggests legal
scholars interested in promoting rights of sexual minorities internationally should focus on
autonomy rather than identity); LADY BOYS, TOM BOYS, RENT BOYS: MALE AND FEMALE
SEXUALITIES IN CONTEMPORARY THAILAND (Peter A. Jackson & Gerard Sullivan eds.,
1999). For an in-depth analysis of the incompatibility of historical Arab conceptions of
sexuality with Western ideas about sexual identity, see JOSEPH A. MASSAD, DESIRING
ARABS (2007).
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ongoing academic debate between liberals and communitarians that
transcends gay rights discourse, and although queer theorists continue
to challenge the essentialist foundations of liberal philosophy, liberal,
universalist paradigms have clearly prevailed in the international legal
sphere. But despite the plausible basis international agreements and
national constitutions provide for these arguments, international
enforcement mechanisms are insufficient to offer much practical
significance to such claims in the near future. Furthermore, given the
depth of anti-homosexual sentiment in many African societies, the use
of national courts to pursue a gay rights agenda, even if initially
successful, has the potential to incite political backlash that could
undermine the legal and physical security of the intended
beneficiaries of litigation. In Part IV, I will examine critiques of
liberalism that might be useful to liberals interested in advancing
homosexual rights in Africa, including arguments about an imperialist
impulse inherent to liberalism and about the potential for liberal
initiatives in the developing world to backfire. I will focus in
particular in Part IV on communitarian philosophy and queer theory,
each of which offers potential insight on likely obstacles to liberal
arguments for gay rights in Africa. In Part V, I will discuss the
anthropological record of same-sex intimacies in various African
cultures. To some degree, this record confirms the anti-essentialist
claims of queer theorists. In Part VI, I will offer observations about
the implications of communitarian thought, queer theory, and African
anthropological evidence for liberals interested in promoting
homosexual rights in Africa. To the extent that communitarian
philosophy coincides with deeply rooted cultural perspectives in
Africa, an individual rights-based agenda may be less likely to
succeed. To the extent that people in Africa who engage in what
Westerners would call homosexual practices are neither thought of as
homosexuals by members of their communities, nor think of
themselves in such terms, Western insistence on categorizing such
individuals as homosexuals may endanger them. Overall, human
rights advocates would do well to consider the potential unintended
consequences of pursuing a liberal agenda to advance homosexual
rights in Africa. In the final analysis, the lessons of this research
suggest that Western lawyers, scholars, policy-makers, and activists
hoping to improve the lives of people who engage in same-sex
intimacies in Africa should proceed with extreme caution.
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I
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY ATTITUDES TOWARD AFRICAN
HOMOSEXUALITY
Today, homosexual activity is legally prohibited in thirty-six of
Africa’s fifty-four countries.15 The severity of the prescribed
punishments for homosexual sex in Africa varies significantly, from a
maximum of one year of imprisonment in Liberia,16 to life
imprisonment in Sierra Leone17 and Tanzania,18 to the death penalty
in Mauritania, parts of Northern Nigeria, Southern Somalia, and
Sudan.19 In Uganda, legislative attempts since 2009 to authorize a
death penalty for “aggravated homosexuality” have received
widespread attention.20 In eleven Francophone African countries,
same-sex sexual intimacy has never been criminalized.21 However,
even in some of these countries, the age of consent for same-sex
sexual activity is higher than the age of consent for heterosexual
sex.22 In Lesotho and South Africa, modern protections for
homosexuals have replaced earlier laws against same-sex sexual
contact, and in Cape Verde, an older proscription of homosexual
activity is absent in the modern penal code.23 In some countries, like

15 LUCAS PAOLI ITABORAHY & JINGSHU ZHU, STATE SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA—A
WORLD SURVEY OF LAWS: CRIMINALISATION, PROTECTION AND RECOGNITION OF SAMESEX LOVE 33 (2013), available at http://old.ilga.org/Statehomophobia/ILGA_State
_Sponsored_Homophobia_2013.pdf.
16 Id. at 51.
17 Id. at 57.
18 Id. at 59.
19 Id. at 58.
20 See, e.g., Daniel Englander, Comment, Protecting the Human Rights of LGBT People
in Uganda in the Wake of Uganda’s “Anti-Homosexuality Bill, 2009,” 25 EMORY INT’L L.
REV. 1263 (2011); Michael Hollander, Note, Gay Rights in Uganda: Seeking to Overturn
Uganda’s Anti-Sodomy Laws, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 219 (2009); Tiffany M. Lebrón,
Comment, “Death to Gays!” Uganda’s ‘One Step Forward, One Step Back’ Approach to
Human Rights, 17 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 173 (2011); Williams, supra note 1.
21 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 21 (noting that same-sex sexual activity has
never been prohibited in Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Cote
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, and Rwanda);
Uganda: Reject Anti-Homosexuality Bill, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, May 10, 2011,
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/05/10/uganda-reject-anti-homosexuality-bill.
22 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 20 (noting a higher age of consent for
homosexual sex than for heterosexual sex in Benin); id. at 24 (stating that the age of
consent in Congo Brazzaville is thirteen for heterosexual sex and twenty-one for
homosexual sex, a distinction inherited from French colonialists).
23 Id.
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Egypt, facially neutral laws have often been used to prosecute people
who engage in same-sex sexual activity.24
As this overview reveals, Francophone African countries have been
less likely to explicitly criminalize same-sex intimacies. This
distinction seems to date to the more permissive policies of Belgian
and French colonialists on this issue in some of their colonies,25 as
compared with the British, who consistently targeted indigenous
corporeal intimacies they deemed deviant in all of their colonies.26
Nonetheless, some Francophone African countries criminalized
homosexual conduct after independence.27 In Lusophone, Africa,
Portuguese colonial laws prohibited sodomy, and both Angola and
Mozambique have retained the prohibition in their current penal
codes.28
The British approach stemmed from law applicable in England,
where the nineteenth-century Offences Against the Person Act had
reduced the punishment for sodomy and other “unnatural” sexual acts
from death to imprisonment for ten years to life. After initially
introducing a version of the Act in India, Britain then exported it to all
of its colonial possessions.29 Today, former British colonies that
continue to criminalize same-sex sexual activity have tended to retain
much of the original language from Section 377, which reads:
Whoever voluntarily has carnal intercourse against the order of
nature with any man, woman or animal shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall be liable to fine.
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal
intercourse necessary to the offence described in this section.30

My own examination of public archives in Zambia reveals the
British colonial government and its predecessor, the British South
Africa Company, used a version of this law to prosecute men who
engaged in same-sex intimacies in the territory during the colonial
period. In some cases, colonial officials used the law to prosecute
Id. at 46.
See, e.g., id. at 20–24. But see Neela Ghoshal, Africa’s Small Steps Toward LGBTI
Equality, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 17, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/07/17
/africas-small-steps-toward-lgbti-equality (noting colonial sodomy laws in Mauritius).
26 Ghoshal, supra note 25.
27 Id. (observing that the French had no sodomy laws in Burundi or Cameroon, but both
countries enacted their own laws penalizing homosexual conduct after independence).
28 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 43, 54.
29 Douglas E. Sanders, 377 and the Unnatural Afterlife of British Colonialism in Asia, 4
ASIAN J. COMP. L. 1, 8 (2009).
30 Central Government Act, No. 45 of 1860, INDIA PEN. CODE (1860), § 377.
24
25
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older males who had sexual contacts with children. For example,
inspection of the 214 criminal cases in Class II Subordinate Court in
1942 in Fort Jameson,31 in what is now Zambia’s Eastern Province,
shows two such prosecutions. In one case, Rex v. Chajaso Zulu, the
defendant, a seventeen-year-old male, pleaded guilty to a charge of
committing “an act of gross indecency with another male” after he
persuaded a thirteen-year-old “to lie on the ground” in the bush near a
village and “then committed the offense.”32 Zulu’s sentence was six
strokes with a cane.33 In the other, Rex v. Hamid Ahmed Malek, the
defendant, a “British Indian Male Adult,” faced a charge of “Indecent
Practices Between Males” after an encounter with Kufwa Zimba, a
nine or ten-year-old boy.34 Likewise, a reading of the ninety-five
available criminal cases in the Native Commissioner’s Court in
Livingstone in 1913 reveals the case of Rex v. Likandu, in which the
defendant pleaded guilty to a charge of committing “an act of gross
indecency with another male person,” a boy about ten years old.35
Likandu claimed to have believed the boy was a woman.36 He
received a sentence of two months imprisonment with hard labor.37
Significantly, although each of these cases involved conduct
current readers would likely conceive of as child molestation and
sexual assault, the nature of the charges demonstrates that, for the
British, the defendants’ transgressions were tied, at least in part, to the
occurrence of same-sex sexual contact.38 In other cases, the British
charged indigenous defendants with “gross indecency with another
male” without specifying the age of the other party.39 These cases
represented, for the British, only a part of a broader effort to control
indigenous sexuality through counterparts to Section 377. In Fort
Jameson in 1942, for example, the colonial government charged two

Fort Jameson is now called Chipata.
Zambia National Archives [ZNA] EP 4/13/6, Case No. 64 of 1942.
33 Id.
34 ZNA EP 4/13/6, Case No. 171 of 1942.
35 ZNA KSC 2/2/2, Case No. 21 of 1913.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 In one case in the Native Commissioner’s Court in Livingstone in 1913, a defendant
did face a charge of “indecent assault on a male person.” The court sentenced the
defendant to one year of imprisonment with hard labor and fifteen lashes. ZNA KSC
2/2/2/, Rex v. Liabwa, Case No. 108 of 1913.
39 See, e.g., ZNA 4/13/19, Regina v. Elias Sowoyo, Case No. 418 of 1954, Subordinate
Court, Class I, Fort Jameson.
31
32
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men with attempting to have carnal knowledge of cows.40 The British,
of course, also sought to use colonial law to shape indigenous
behavior more generally to reflect contemporary British values.41
As I will detail in Part V, anthropological evidence reveals that
people from a wide variety of African cultures, before, during, and
after colonial rule, have engaged in what many Westerners would
characterize as homosexual sex. Despite this evidence, Africans
opposed to homosexuality now frequently cast homosexuality as unAfrican and as a Western, neocolonial menace.42 In 1999,
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe expressed this sentiment in
referring to Britain’s “gay government,” which he believed was
attempting to impose homosexuality on Africans.43 In the same year,
Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi declared, “It is not right that a
man should go with another man or a woman with another woman. It
40 ZNA 4/13/6, Rex v. Mayonga Banda, Case No. 16 of 1942; Rex v. James Mvula,
Case No. 153 of 1942.
41 A prominent example of such use of the law was the British prosecution of colonial
subjects for claiming to have the powers of witchcraft or accusing others of being witches.
See MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE
IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA 85–102 (1985). British prosecutions of colonial subjects for
claiming to have powers of witchcraft, or accusing others of being witches, reflected
changing attitudes on the issue at home—in seventeenth-century England, legislation
punished people for being witches, but by the early eighteenth century, the law no longer
recognized the possibility of actual witchcraft, and new legislation punished people for
pretending to have the power of witchcraft. Id. at 94. My own investigation of colonial
cases in the Zambia National Archives shows the prevalence of British prosecutions of
indigenous subjects for claiming to be witches or accusing others of being witches. For
example, in Mwinilunga District (in Northwestern Province in Zambia) seven of seventyone criminal cases in the Native Commissioner’s Court in 1915 involved witchcraft
charges. ZNA KSE 3/2/2/2. In the same court in 1926, three of 135 prosecutions were for
witchcraft claims. ZNA 3/2/2/5. In 1927, three of 110 criminal cases in that court involved
such charges. ZNA 3/2/2/6. In 1956, the Class III Subordinate Court in Fort Jameson
sentenced one person convicted of accusing another of witchcraft to eighteen months of
imprisonment with hard labor. ZNA EP 4/13/20, R v. Shadrack Jere, Jan. 27, 1956.
42 For some authors, African resistance to homosexuality represents a rejection only of
Western-inspired gay identity, not a condemnation of same-sex physical intimacy more
broadly. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 14, at 126 (asserting that that, in the case of
Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s public denunciations of homosexuality, “sexual
identity per se, not same-sex sexual conduct, is the central target of such attacks”); Joseph
Massad, Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World, 14 PUB.
CULTURE 361 (2002) (arguing that Egyptian prosecutions represented resistance to
Western gay identity rather than to same-sex intimacy). But although many antihomosexual pronouncements by Africans have reflected resistance to perceived Western
imperialism, much African criticism of homosexuality has involved broad condemnation
of same-sex sexual practices. Furthermore, those who have suggested a distinction
between African criticism of homosexual identity and rejection of same-sex intimacy more
generally have tended to be Western theorists, not African leaders themselves.
43 EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at 4.
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is against African tradition and Biblical teachings. I will not shy away
from warning Kenyans against the dangers of the scourge.”44 In
Namibia, Alpheus Naruseb, the secretary for Information and
Publicity for the South West Africa People’s Organization, asserted,
“It should be noted that most of the ardent supporters of these perverts
are Europeans who imagine themselves to be the bulwark of
civilisation and enlightenment. They are not only appropriating
foreign ideas in our society but also destroying the local culture by
hiding behind the façade of the very democracy and human right (sic)
we have created.”45 In 2004, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo
declared homosexuality to be “unbiblical, unnatural and definitely unAfrican.”46 In a 2013 article published by the Ghana Broadcasting
Corporation, a journalist noted recent British threats to cut aid to
Ghana if the country persisted in criminalizing homosexuality and
questioned, “[W]hy is Ghana always a target for Britain? Is it a case
of neo-colonialism?”47
The sense of conflict between a pro-homosexual West and African
opposition to homosexuality has been evident amongst religious as
well as political leaders. Perhaps most famously, at the 1998 Lambeth
Conference of the Anglican Communion, African and Asian bishops
combined to defeat North American and European motions in favor of
gay rights. At the time, the United States Episcopal Church had
already been ordaining openly gay clergy for several years, and by
2003, the Church of England would propose a gay man for Bishop of
Reading. 48 Nonetheless, African and Asian clergy outnumbered their
North American and European counterparts at Lambeth, and, in the
end, the conference passed a statement declaring homosexual
practices to be “incompatible with scripture.”49 The belief that
Western appeals for homosexual rights represent merely the latest
iteration of Western cultural imperialism certainly increases the
likelihood of resistance in societies buffeted by a long history of

44 NEVILLE
HOAD, AFRICAN INTIMACIES: RACE, HOMOSEXUALITY, AND
GLOBALIZATION xii (2007).
45 Id. at 15.
46 World Briefing—Africa: Nigeria: President Backs African Bishops Over Gays, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 28, 2004), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0DE7D7123
DF93BA15753C1A9629C8B63.
47 Justice Mingle, Proposed UK Visa Restriction, GHANA BROADCASTING
CORPORATION (June 28, 2013), http://www.gbcghana.com/index.php?id=1.1436391.
48 PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM: THE COMING OF GLOBAL CHRISTIANITY
251 (2002).
49 Id. See also HOAD, supra note 44, at 51.
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colonial interference. As I will discuss in further detail below, there is
a sense (although largely unappreciated by African leaders who attack
homosexuality) in which this belief is correct.
Overall, broad majorities of the populations in all African countries
where data is available have expressed disapproval of homosexuality.
In 2003, a Pew research report including information from nine
African countries revealed that majorities in all nine countries
believed society should not accept homosexuality.50 This ranged from
a mere 62 percent of the Angolan population who disapproved of
homosexuality to 99 percent of Kenyans.51 By 2013, Pew data on
seven African countries continued to show popular disapproval of
homosexuality in all countries, with majorities of over 90 percent of
people in six of the seven nations in the study believing that society
should not accept homosexuality.52
Western rights advocates have tended to respond to claims about
the un-African nature of homosexuality with counter-assertions,
including recitations of the history of colonial imposition of antihomosexual norms,53 and anthropological observations that seem to
refute African contentions.54 Neville Hoad, an American-based
English Professor from South Africa, has described these Western
efforts as attempts to “consolidate[e] evidence from elsewhere to

50 The 2003 report found that 62 percent of Angolans, 63 percent of South Africans, 84
percent of people from Ivory Coast, 93 percent of Ghanaians, 95 percent of Ugandans, 95
percent of Nigerians, 96 percent of Malians, 98 percent of Senegalese, and 99 percent of
Kenyans believed society should not accept homosexuality. News Release: Global Views
on Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, 19, Nov.
18, 2003, http://www.pewforum.org/uploadedfiles/Orphan_Migrated_Content/religion
-homosexuality.pdf.
51 Id.
52 The 2013 report found that 61% of South Africans, 90% of Kenyans, 96% of
Ugandans, 96% of Ghanaians, 96% of Senegalese, and 98% of Nigerians believed society
should not accept homosexuality. The Global Divide on Homosexuality, PEW RESEARCH
CENTER (June 4, 2013), http://www.pewglobal.org/2013 /06/04/the-global-divide-onhomosexuality/.
53 See, e.g., EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at 7 (stating that African arguments against
homosexuality “appear to be borrowed wholesale from social conservatives in the West,
while repressive laws are a direct legacy of colonial rule. Even the claim that same-sex
sexual behaviour is un-African appears to have originated in the West rather than Africa
itself.”); Eusebius McKaiser, Homosexuality Un-African? The Claim is an Historical
Embarrassment, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012
/oct/02/homosexuality-unafrican-claim-historical-embarrassment.
54 See, e.g., EPPRECHT, supra note 5; RUTH MORGAN AND SASKIA WIERENGA, TOMMY
BOYS, LESBIAN MEN AND ANCESTRAL WIVES: FEMALE SAME-SEX PRACTICES IN AFRICA
(2006); STEPHEN O. MURRAY & WILL ROSCOE, BOY-WIVES AND FEMALE HUSBANDS:
STUDIES IN AFRICAN HOMOSEXUALITIES (1998); McKaiser, supra note 53.
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universalize and naturalize one’s own experience,” and has noted that
such efforts to universalize Western notions of homosexuality have a
longstanding lineage, dating to the nineteenth century.55 In Hoad’s
assessment, typical of the postmodernist claims of queer theorists,
these attempts to prove the existence of minority sexual identity lack
the liberating potential homosexual rights advocates assume, for they
“precisely reproduce[] the terms of the debate [they] wish . . . to end
in a landscape of assertion and counterassertion.”56
I will discuss the insight arguments like Hoad’s might offer to
liberal rights advocates in Part IV. First, however, I will provide an
overview of the primarily liberal claims by Westerners hoping to
improve the lives of people who engage in same-sex intimacies in
Africa. Ultimately, while there are good reasons to question the
efficacy of liberal arguments, these sorts of claims have tended to
define the Western response to antihomosexual sentiment from
Africans, shaping the policies of Western governments and
influencing the development of international law.
Recent appeals by human rights organizations are numerous. In
May of 2013, in response to an ongoing sodomy prosecution in
Zambia, Human Rights Watch commanded, in a headline, Zambia:
Stop Prosecuting People for Homosexuality.57 Invoking the liberal
foundations of Zambian and international law, the organization
argued that “[t]he Zambian government is obligated under
international law and its own constitution to respect the private lives
and personal liberties of everyone in the country, and to cease
prosecuting people for consensual adult sex.”58 Similarly, Amnesty
International’s director of law and policy recently condemned antihomosexuality laws across the African continent, stating, “These
poisonous laws must be repealed and the human rights of all Africans
upheld.”59 In the legal academy, law review articles have frequently

HOAD, supra note 44, at xxv.
Id. at xxiv (alteration in original).
57 Zambia: Stop Prosecuting People for Homosexuality, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May
20, 2013), http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/05/20/zambia-stop-prosecuting-people-homo
sexuality.
58 Id.
59 Erin Conway-Smith, Africa’s Anti-Gay Attacks Reach ‘Dangerous’ Levels, GLOBAL
POST (June 25, 2013), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/africa/130625
/anti-gay-attacks-africa-criminalization-homosexuality-amnest-international.
55
56
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advanced liberal legal arguments for the protection of homosexual
status in Africa.60
Such arguments by academics and human rights organizations have
paralleled the words and actions of Western governments and
international organizations. In December of 2011, President Barack
Obama instructed federal agencies to begin promoting homosexual
and transgender rights overseas. At the same time, Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton told the United Nations Human Rights Council that
“Gay rights are human rights, and human rights are gay rights.”61 In
Senegal in June, 2013, Obama praised the previous week’s United
States Supreme Court rulings overturning the Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA) and clearing the way for gay marriage in California.
Obama argued that although different countries’ customs and
religious beliefs should be respected, all people must be treated
equally.62 Acknowledging that the “issue of gays and lesbians and
how they are treated has come up and has been controversial in many
parts of Africa,” Obama stated that he wanted the “African people to
hear just what I believe. People should be treated equally. And that’s
a principle that I think should be applied universally.”63 Senegal’s
President, Macky Sall, responded that Senegal is not ready to
decriminalize homosexuality.64
Western appeals for greater tolerance of homosexuality in Africa
have been accompanied, at times, by implicit or explicit threats to cut
aid to noncompliant countries. In Hillary Clinton’s speech to the
Human Rights Council, she promised “to ensure that our foreign
assistance promotes the protection of LGBT rights.”65 In late 2011,

60 See, e.g., Sophie M. Clavier, Objection Overruled: The Binding Nature of the
International Norm Prohibiting Discrimination Against Homosexual and Transgendered
Individuals, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 385 (2012); Katyal, supra note 14 (arguing for the
use of privacy arguments rather than nondiscrimination arguments to advance the rights of
sexual minorities internationally); Englander, supra note 20; Courtney E. Finerty, Note,
Being Gay In Kenya: The Implications of Kenya’s New Constitution for its Anti-Sodomy
Laws, 45 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 431 (2012); Hollander, supra note 20; Lebrón, supra note
20.
61 The Associated Press, Africa’s Anti-Gay Laws: A Look at Uganda, Malawi and
More, June 24, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/24/africa-anti-gay-laws_n
_3491 565.html.
62 Jennifer Lazuta, In Senegal, Obama Touts Gay Rights, USA TODAY, June 28, 2013,
at 2A.
63 Drew Hinshaw, Obama Promotes Sub-Saharan Ties, WALL ST. J., June 28, 2013.
64 Id. Lazuta, supra note 62.
65 Robbie Corey-Boulet, The Obama Administration’s Bold But Risky Plan to Make
Africa Gay-Friendly, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/inter
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British Prime Minister David Cameron made a much more
straightforward statement that Britain would cut aid to countries that
fail to respect homosexual rights.66 Meanwhile, bodies like the United
Nations Human Rights Committee have repeatedly condemned laws
that discriminate against homosexuals.67 Ultimately, backlash against
Western appeals for homosexual rights in Africa may explain
increasing numbers of prosecutions of people who engage in samesex intimacies in some countries, efforts to increase penalties for
homosexual conduct, and, generally, increasingly negative public
focus on an issue that most people had previously ignored.68
As I will discuss below, the ideas of communitarians and queer
theorists, coupled with evidence of African cultural attitudes and
practices, pose significant challenges for liberal human rights
activists. Nonetheless, the profound potential of liberal arguments to
increase human freedom makes liberal philosophy an intuitively
appealing framework for improving the lives of homosexuals around
the world. Moreover, liberal philosophy has had a momentous impact
on both international law and the domestic law of countries around
the world, including African nations. The denial by communitarians
and queer theorists of the existence of rights also suggests the
inherent limitations of any approach that requires total disavowal of
foundational liberal principles. Thus, while I believe that investigation
of African cultures and the ideas of communitarians and queer
theorists suggest reasons for extreme caution in attempting to advance
a liberal homosexual rights agenda in Africa, I do not propose that
liberals should abandon their philosophical allegiance. Rather,
consideration of all available evidence suggests that traditional liberal
strategies could backfire. In the next Part, I offer an account of liberal
philosophy in general and liberal legal arguments for gay rights in
particular.

national/archive/2012/03/the-obama-administrations-bold-but-risky-plan-to-make-africa
-gay-friendly/254086/.
66 Ghana Refuses to Grant Gays’ Rights Despite Aid Threat, BBC NEWS (Nov. 2,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15558769.
67 See infra Part III.
68 In Liberia, for example, there were no prosecutions for sodomy in the years
preceding Obama’s instruction to federal agencies to promote homosexual rights abroad.
The announcement, however, sparked widespread denunciations of homosexuality in the
country, as well as efforts to enhance the penalties for same-sex sexual intimacy in the
country. See infra notes 343–44 and surrounding text. Likewise, in Zambia, sodomy
prosecutions in 2013 are the first in the country’s recent history, amidst increasing public
hostility toward the idea of homosexuality. See infra note 358.
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II
LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY AND LIBERAL LEGAL FRAMEWORKS
Writing over a decade ago, Carlos Ball noted that despite an
ongoing debate in the legal academy between liberals and
communitarians, commentary on the status of gay men and lesbians in
the United States had largely ignored that debate. Instead, those
discussing homosexuality in America had tended to use a liberal,
rights-based structure to frame the dialogue.69 Today, political and
legal debates about homosexuality tend to exclude not only
consideration of communitarian philosophy, but also analysis of the
observations of queer theorists, the anthropologists, philosophers,
sociologists, historians and literary critics who have, for decades,
questioned the essentialist basis for homosexual identity that liberal
rights advocates have often assumed.70 As Professor Ball observed,
this liberal approach centers on claims of rights to privacy and to nondiscrimination,71 both fundamental tenets of liberal theory. Since
Professor Ball made his observations, both popular and legal culture
in the United States have evolved dramatically toward greater
acceptance of the claims of liberal, homosexual rights activists. The
Supreme Court, in Lawrence v. Texas,72 overturned Texas’s antisodomy law, overruling its 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.73
Meanwhile, although thirty-three states have passed constitutional
amendments or legislation banning same-sex marriage, sixteen states
and Washington, D.C., allow homosexual marriage, and several other
states allow civil unions or other legal partnerships granting many of
the legal benefits of marriage.74 In June of 2013, the Supreme Court
struck down the Defense of Marriage Act,75 which had denied federal
benefits to married same-sex couples, and cleared the way for samesex marriage in California by leaving in place a district court

69 Carlos A. Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 443, 446
(2000) (hereinafter Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights).
70 See Part II, supra. Katyal, supra note 14, at 118 (surmising that the because of the
“polarization that [queer theory] produced between queer theorists and gay rights activists,
queer theory has remained a predominantly academic, rather than a legal, enterprise”).
71 Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 446.
72 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
73 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
74 Defining Marriage: Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws,
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (June 26, 2013), http://www.ncsl.org
/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx#1.
75 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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determination that a California constitutional amendment banning
homosexual marriage violated the federal Constitution.76
As in the United States, discussion of the status of homosexuals
internationally has tended to center on notions of equality and
autonomy at the heart of liberal ideology. Unsurprisingly, then, this
liberal focus has shaped analysis of the laws of the numerous African
countries that have criminalized homosexual conduct and, more
broadly, have implemented policies that marginalize and discriminate
against homosexuals.77 This rights-based focus has also dictated the
terms in which Western and Western-influenced activists have
characterized and critiqued expressions of popular African sentiment,
often by national leaders, condemning homosexuals as deviant,
unnatural, immoral, and influenced by corrupt Western ideology and
values.
There are good reasons for adhering to a liberal framework in
seeking to improve the lives of homosexuals in Africa. First, as
mentioned above, the liberal paradigm has become fully entrenched in
international law. With the ratification of post World War II
conventions beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
liberal, universalist philosophy became the foundation of a new body
of international law, defining relationships between states and citizens
in areas that before had been left to the realm of domestic political
decision-making. As the former colonies of European powers became
sovereign nations in the second half of the twentieth century, the new
states not only ratified these international human rights documents,
but also implemented constitutions reflecting the liberal values of the
Western countries from which they had gained independence. Second,
liberalism offers an appealing basis for advocacy because its
presupposition of rights that precede political acceptance provides a
conceptual bulwark against the perils that alternatives to liberalism,
like communitarianism and queer theory, pose for homosexuals;
ultimately, if, as communitarians and queer theorists suggest, there is
no room for an idea of rights that precede other social norms,
protection of the interests of homosexuals and other minority groups
depends entirely on social acceptance of minority interests. The idea
of rights becomes, in that case, a tautology at best.
In Part IV, I will discuss communitarian thought and queer theory,
including analysis of the ways these schools of thought might inform
76
77

Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
See, e.g., supra note 60.
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liberal approaches to human rights advocacy in Africa. At this point,
it is worth providing an overview of liberal philosophy and the
international, regional, and domestic legal frameworks that have
developed as a result of liberal influence. It is also worth discussing,
in particular, the arguments liberal rights advocates have offered in
support of homosexual rights in Africa and around the world.
Traditional Lockean liberalism based its central claims on the
fundamental, universal nature of all people. Specifically, Locke
postulated that humans are naturally free, that humans are, in all
morally significant ways, equal, and that people are rational.78 The
claims of contemporary liberal human rights advocates continue to
depend on these basic notions of equality and rationality at the heart
of classical liberalism. From these basic shared attributes, two
practical conclusions follow. First, if people are equal, then we must
treat as morally and legally suspect any policy that favors some
groups of people over others based on false claims of the inherent
superiority of the favored group. Second, if we are all more or less
rational, then each of us is likely to be best situated to determine her
own best interests and to direct the course of her own life.
The idea that all humans are equal and rational and, therefore, have
essential rights to autonomy and to equal treatment under the law has
guided liberal arguments since the Enlightenment, inspiring the work
of modern philosophers as diverse as John Rawls, with his concern
for distributive justice and equality of opportunity, and libertarians
like Robert Nozick.79 In the United States and internationally, these
two notions have led to the development of two lines of jurisprudence
addressing discrimination and privacy/autonomy rights respectively.
Each of these lines of cases lends potential support to claims by
advocates for homosexual rights.
A. Equal Protection
In the United States—the source of much of the scholarship
advocating for homosexual rights internationally, and a source of
great influence on the development of the international human rights
framework and of national constitutions throughout postcolonial
Africa80—the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
78 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT

II, ¶¶ 4–5 (Peter Laslett ed., 1967).
See, e.g., E. Vance Randall, Same-Sex Marriage and Education: Implications for
Schools, Students, and Parents, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 385, 397–98 (2011).
80 See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012) (noting that as of 1987, 160 of 170 nations in
79
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of the Constitution provided the basis for the twentieth century’s
monumental Supreme Court decisions prohibiting official prejudice
against blacks, women, and, on one occasion, homosexuals. The
Declaration of Independence itself asserted the equality of men as a
self-evident truth,81 but it took a civil war, passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and nearly another century of incremental social
evolution before the nation truly began the process of living up to this
ideal. Even in recent years, however, equal protection in the United
States has proved a somewhat problematic route for advancing gay
rights. Under the Supreme Court’s established framework for
evaluating equal protection claims, official discrimination based on
status other than race, religion, national origin, and gender has
generally been permissible so long as the law passes rational basis
review, the least demanding level of constitutional scrutiny. The
Supreme Court in 1996 did strike down, using mere rational basis
review, a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting
governmental treatment of homosexuals as a protected class.82
Similarly, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, Justice
O’Connor found Texas’s law prohibiting homosexual sodomy but not
heterosexual sodomy to be irrationally discriminatory.83 Nevertheless,
the Court has found most laws subject to rational basis scrutiny to be
rationally related to some legitimate governmental purpose, thus
passing constitutional muster under that lenient standard.84
The future potential for use of equal protection arguments to
advance homosexual standing in the United States is uncertain. In
Windsor v. United States, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals used
intermediate scrutiny to assess the constitutionality of the Defense of
Marriage Act, invalidating the Act as not substantially related to an
important governmental purpose.85 Intermediate scrutiny, traditionally
applied to gender86 and illegitimacy,87 offers significantly more
the world had modeled their constitutions on the United States Constitution, but observing
a decline in the influence of the United States Constitution since the 1990s).
81 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
82 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
83 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 582–83 (2003).(O’Connor, J., concurring).
84 See, e.g., id. at 579–80 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that laws “such as
economic or tax legislation” generally survive rational basis scrutiny, even when the laws
appear improvident, but asserting that a mere desire to damage a politically unpopular
group is not a legitimate governmental purpose); Robert B. Sobelman, An Unconstitutional
Response to Citizens United, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 341, n.83 (2011) (observing that when
the Court uses rational basis review, “it almost always upholds the law in question”).
85 Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185–88 (2d Cir. 2012).
86 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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protection than rational basis review and could prove an attractive
mechanism for striking discriminatory laws to promote homosexual
rights. Additionally, in his 2010 decision in Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
Federal District Court Judge Walker noted the history of stereotyping
and discrimination against homosexuals and asserted that “gays and
lesbians are the type of minority strict scrutiny was designed to
protect.”88 Laws subject to strict scrutiny, which requires a law to be
necessary to a compelling government purpose and narrowly tailored
to meet that purpose to be constitutionally valid, rarely survive the
Court’s review.89
Nonetheless, Judge Walker held it unnecessary to determine which
standard of review applies to laws discriminating against
homosexuals because, in his estimation, California’s constitutional
provision prohibiting same-sex marriage failed even rational basis
review.90 Although the Ninth Circuit’s narrower ruling in the case
included no language suggesting homosexuals should benefit from
strict scrutiny,91 the Supreme Court disposed of the case on standing
grounds, leaving Judge Walker’s opinion intact.92 The Second
Circuit’s holding in Windsor is, to date, the only federal case clearly
holding that even intermediate scrutiny should apply to laws that
discriminate against gays and lesbians. The Supreme Court’s decision
in Windsor contained equal protection language, but, ultimately, the
standard of review and the basis for the decision were unclear. Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion asserted that DOMA was invalid because
“no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage
and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to
protect in personhood and dignity,”93 suggesting without explicitly
stating that the Court was using a rational basis standard of review.
Additionally, the opinion contains some elements of substantive due
process, protecting privacy and autonomy rights.94 Most importantly,
however, the opinion’s treatment of federalism, suggesting DOMA’s
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
Perry v. Schwarzenneger, 704 F.Supp.2d 921, 997 (N.D. Cal 2010).
89 See, e.g., Richard E. Levy, Political Process and Individual Fairness Rationales in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Suspect Classification Jurisprudence, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 33, 35
(2010) (stating that “strict scrutiny is usually so demanding that laws subject to strict
scrutiny are rarely upheld”).
90 Id.
91 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (2012).
92 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
93 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
94 Id. at 2695 (holding that “DOMA is unconstitutional as a deprivation of the liberty of
the person protected by the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution”).
87
88
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invalidity might be tied to the need to respect the sovereignty of states
that have chosen to allow same-sex marriage,95 could mean that equal
protection arguments will fail against states that have decided not to
permit homosexual marriage.
Internationally, equal protection arguments have had some limited
success as a mechanism for advancing gay rights. The ratification of
instrumental human rights covenants after World War II represented
an embrace of liberalism and a turn away from the positivist
philosophy that had previously dominated international law.96 The
new post-war body of international human rights treaties included
rights both to equal treatment and autonomy, the core guarantees of
liberal philosophy. Each of the world’s three primary international
human rights treaties—the International Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—establishes the right to freedom from
official discrimination.
The UDHR, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
the aftermath of the war, asserted that all people are “born free and
equal in dignity and rights,”97 “that all are entitled to equal protection
against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against
incitement to such discrimination,”98 and that all people are entitled to
the rights set forth in the Declaration “without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”99 Later, the
ICCPR echoed these ideas in its Article 26, urging that, “the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion,
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”100 The
ICESCR provides that “[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant

95 Id. at 2691 (stating that “the Federal Government, through our history, has deferred
to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations”).
96 See, e.g., Clavier, supra note 60, at 403 (noting that the aftermath of World War II
gave rise to a human rights movement that “changed the conceptualization of sovereignty,
and by extension challenged strict positivism”).
97 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc
A/RES/217(III), art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR],
98 Id. art. 7.
99 Id. art. 2.
100 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 26, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
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undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present
Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind” based
on categories identical to those enunciated in the UDHR and the
ICCPR.101
With 167 states parties to the ICCPR102 and 160 states parties to the
ICESCR,103 nearly every country in the world has acceded to these
conventions, including the vast majority of African nations.104 Yet it
was unclear until the mid-1990s whether any of the nondiscrimination
provisions of these instruments would be construed as protecting the
rights of homosexuals. Of course, no one would seriously contend
that any significant number of ratifying states would have understood
the equal protection provisions of the ICCPR or the ICESCR at their
inception in 1966 to safeguard the rights of homosexuals.
Yet the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties established a
broader framework for interpretation of international agreements.
Instead of concentrating solely on the actual intention of parties to a
convention at the time of ratification, the Vienna Convention
mandates that treaties be interpreted “in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”105 Moreover, as
Professor Sophie Clavier has noted, there are compelling reasons to
eschew a strictly intent-based approach to interpretation of human
rights treaties in particular. Because such covenants uphold the rights
of individuals against potential abuses of state power, the
understandings of states themselves are less important than in the case
of an ordinary treaty designed merely to advance the interests of the
ratifying nations.106
In any case, in 1994, the United Nations Human Rights Committee,
established under the ICCPR to assess the compliance of ratifying

101 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(2), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
102 United Nations Treaty Collection: International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&
chapter=4&lang=en.
103 United Nations Treaty Collection: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-3&chapter
=4&lang=en.
104 In Africa, only Western Sahara has failed to ratify the ICCPR, and only
Mozambique, Western Sahara, and Zimbabwe have not ratified the ICESCR.
105 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331.
106 Clavier, supra note 60, at 388–89.
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nations,107 ruled for the first time that the ICCPR protects the right of
homosexuals to be free from official discrimination.108 Although the
Human Rights Committee’s opinions are nonbinding, they are highly
persuasive interpretations of the ICCPR.109 In Toonen v. Australia, the
Committee considered the claim of Nicholas Toonen that the
Tasmanian Criminal Code’s proscription of private sexual contact
between men violated Toonen’s right to equal protection under
Article 26 of the Covenant.110 Because the Committee determined the
Code provisions violated Toonen’s privacy rights under Article 17 of
the Covenant, it found it unnecessary to decide whether homosexuals
are a protected class under Article 26.111 Nonetheless, the Committee
asserted that the treaty’s reference to sex as a protected class “is to be
taken as including sexual orientation.”112 In making this
determination, the Committee sidestepped Australia’s request for
guidance on whether the term “any other status” in Article 26 might
encompass homosexuals.113
Since Toonen, the Committee has equivocated on whether it
remains committed to interpreting sex as including sexual orientation
under Article 26.114 The Committee did follow Toonen with a 2000
decision in which it held Australia’s denial of pension benefits to the
surviving same-sex partner of a war veteran violated Article 26 by
discriminating against the complainant “on the basis of his sex or

107 Human Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org
/english/bodies/hrc/.
108 Toonen v. Australia, Comm. No. 488/1992, U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, vol. II U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994).
109 HENRY J. STEINER, ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 915 (3d. ed. 2008) (quoting others describing the Human Rights
Committee’s decisions as, “‘in effect, binding,’” despite the formally nonbinding nature of
the Committee’s communications); Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual
Orientation and Human Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence,
9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 61, 82 (1996) (stating that parties to the ICCPR are bound by the
text of the Covenant, rather than by decisions of the Human Rights Committee); Lorraine
Finlay, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Kadi Decision and Judicial Review of
Security Council Resolutions, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 477, 491 (2010) (noting that
communications of the Human Rights Committee are nonbinding).
110 Toonen, supra note 108, at 26.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Englander, supra note 20 (citing Michael O’Flaherty & John Fisher, Sexual
Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law: Contextualizing the
Yogyakarta Principles, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 207, 216–17 (2008)).
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sexual orientation.”115 However, even if this construction fails to
garner continued support, the catchall “any other status” may be a
viable avenue for the continued pursuit of homosexual rights against
discrimination under the Covenant.
Whatever avenue it takes, the Human Rights Committee has made
clear in recent years its enduring commitment to preventing
government discrimination against homosexuals as it has regularly
urged reform from countries engaging in official discrimination or
failing to provide sufficient mechanisms to prevent discriminatory
practices.116 Likewise, the United Nations Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has expressed its conviction that the
ICESCR’s reference to “any other status” prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation.117 Finally, the United Nations Human
Rights Council, which conducts Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR) of
the human rights records of all UN member states, has also included
repeated recommendations by Council members for legal reform in
countries that discriminate against gays and lesbians.118 In 2011, the
Human Rights Council passed a resolution expressing “grave concern
at acts of violence and discrimination, in all regions of the world,
committed against individuals because of their sexual orientation and
gender identity.”119
Professor Clavier has argued that emerging international
consensus, as reflected in decisions like Toonen and the now
115 Young v Australia, UN GAOR, 78th Sess., Hum Rts Comm, UN Doc
CCPR/C/78/D/941/2000 (2000).
116 See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Committee (hereinafter HRC), Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: Russian Federation, Nov. 24, 2009,
CCPR/C/RUS/CO/6; HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee
Regarding the United States of America, Feb. 12, 2008, P25, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1; HRC, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee Regarding Kenya, Mar. 24, 2005, P27, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/83/KEN; HRC,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee Regarding Egypt, Oct. 31,
2002, P19 U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/76/EGY.
117 U.N. Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No.
20: Non-Discrimination in Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (art. 2, P2, of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), P32, U.N. Doc.
E/C.12/GC/20 (July 2, 2009).
118 See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal
Periodic Review: Benin, A/HRC/22/9, Dec. 11, 2012; Human Rights Council, Report of
the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Nigeria, A/HRC/11/26, Oct. 5,
2009; Human Rights Council, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic
Review: Uganda, A/HRC/19/16, Dec. 22, 2011; Human Rights Council, Report of the
Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Zambia, A/HRC/22/13, Dec. 31, 2012.
119 Human Rights Council Res. 17/19, Rep. of the Human Rights Council, 17th Sess.,
May 31–June 17, 2011, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/L.9/Rev.1 (June 15, 2011).
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numerous declarations of national courts, regional courts, and UN
treaty bodies, has rendered the principle of nondiscrimination against
homosexuals a rule of customary international law.120 Clavier
acknowledged the traditional notion that customary international law
is not binding on persistent objectors and that a large number of
countries, including many African nations, would clearly qualify as
having persistently objected to the idea that homosexual activity
should be protected.121 Nonetheless, Clavier asserted the strictly
positivist view of international law, especially in the realm of human
rights, is in decline and that, even if a rule has not attained status as a
jus cogens norm, objection may no longer be sufficient to avoid being
obligated to comply with the law.122
This argument may be difficult to sustain.123 By definition,
persistent objectors may opt out of customary international law, so
long as the norm in question is not a jus cogens norm, and the
evidence Professor Clavier marshaled in support of her assertion does
not establish the claim. In support of her contention, Professor Clavier
cited Roper v. Simmons,124 in which the United States Supreme Court
abolished the death penalty for juvenile offenders, and Lustig-Prean
v. United Kingdom, in which the European Court of Human Rights
found in favor of claimants who had been dismissed from the British
Navy based on their sexual orientation.125 Clavier asserted the United
States Supreme Court’s decision in Roper represented its recognition
that, despite the country’s status as a persistent objector, international
opinion demonstrated “the impossibility of objecting to the changing
values of the international society.”126 Yet the Supreme Court clearly
stated in its opinion that, while international opinion was persuasive,
it was not controlling.127 Rather, according to the Court, international

Clavier, supra note 60, at 401.
Id. at 404–07.
122 Id. at 403–07.
123 But see Sonia Bychkov Green, Currency of Love: Customary International Law and
the Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 53,
(making the same argument as Clavier).
124 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
125 Press Release, Registry of Eur. Ct. H.R., Judgments in the Cases of Lustig-Prean
and Beckett v. The United Kingdom and Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom (Sept.
27, 1999), available at lgbt.poradna-prava.cz/folder05/lustig.doc.
126 Clavier, supra note 60, at 406.
127 543 U.S. at 578 (stating that “[t]he opinion of the world community, while not
controlling our outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions”).
120
121
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consensus merely confirmed the Court’s own conclusions.128
Likewise, in Lustig-Prean, although the European Court of Human
Rights stated that it could not ignore “widespread and consistently
developing views or the legal changes in the domestic laws of
Contracting States in favour of the admission of homosexuals into the
armed forces of those States,” the Court’s determination ultimately
turned on its holding that the United Kingdom had violated the
privacy provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.129
Even if Professor Clavier’s contention that persistent objection is no
longer sufficient to avoid application of customary international law
were to gain widespread support, however, the problems of
enforcement endemic to international law in general would likely
render such a conclusion largely academic for the time being.
Regional human rights instruments offer language similar to that of
international human rights documents, with potential to protect
homosexuals against discrimination. In particular, the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights includes a broad anti-discrimination
provision, with catchall protection for “other status,” mirroring the
language in the ICCPR and the ICESCR.130 The African Charter,
however, also limits the exercise of individual rights with reference to
the duties individuals owe in exercising those rights, including the
duty to exercise one’s rights with due regard for “morality and
common interest.”131 The Charter also asserts that “[t]he promotion
and protection of morals and traditional values recognized by the
community shall be the duty of the State.”132 Unsurprisingly, given
prevailing cultural, moral, and legal norms in much of Africa, the
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has never used the
Charter to protect homosexual rights.133

Id.
Judgments in the Cases of Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom and
Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, supra note 125.
130 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 2, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter African Charter].
131 Id. art. 27.
132 Id. art. 17(3).
133 In addition to these obstacles, the requirement that states parties submit to individual
claims before the African Court can hear such claims is a significant impediment to any
favorable human rights rulings from the Court. See infra note 201. Nonetheless, the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, charged with interpreting Charter
rights and hearing complaints against states parties, has expressed concern about
“intolerance toward sexual minorities.” African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights, Concluding Observations and Recommendations on the Periodic Report of the
Republic of Cameroon, May 11–25, 2005, P14, ACHPR, 39th Ordinary Sess. (2005).
128
129
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In contrast to the African Court, regional human rights courts in
other parts of the world have issued definitive rulings protecting
homosexual rights. In February 2012, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights ruled that sexual orientation is a suspect classification
under the American Convention on Human Rights, invalidating the
Chilean Supreme Court’s denial of a mother’s custody of her children
on the basis of her homosexuality.134 Likewise, the European Court of
Human Rights has repeatedly cited the European Convention on
Human Rights’ nondiscrimination provision as a basis for striking
down laws that discriminated against homosexuals.135
Nondiscrimination provisions in African constitutions also offer
some potential for protection of homosexuals. Most African
constitutions, unlike the United States Constitution, tend to list
categories of people protected from discrimination. The constitutions
of some African nations include broad catchall protections for “other
status,” or its functional equivalent, similar to the language of
international human rights documents.136 Others that do not contain
134 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Inter-Am Ct HR (judgment of Feb 24, 2012),
online at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4f840a122.html.
135 See, e.g., Karner v. Austria, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, 210–13, (invalidating an
Austrian law that denied same-sex partners succession of tenancy as violating the
Convention’s privacy and nondiscrimination provisions); L. & V. v. Austria, 2003-I Eur.
Ct. H.R. 29, (striking down as violating the Convention’s antidiscrimination provision an
Austrian law that criminalized sexual relations between adults and minors between the
ages of 14 and 18 only if both participants were male).
136 See, e.g., CONST. OF CAMEROON, art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status”); CONST. OF MALAWI OF 1994, art. 20 (prohibiting discrimination “on
grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality,
ethnic or social origin, disability, property, birth or other status”); CONST. OF KENYA, art.
27(1), (4) (“Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and
equal benefit of the law”; “The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against
any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status,
ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress,
language or birth”) (italics added); CONST. OF NIGERIA, art. 15(2) (“Accordingly, national
integration shall be actively encouraged, whilst discrimination on the grounds of place of
origin, sex, religion, status, ethnic or linguistic association or ties shall be prohibited”)
(italics added); CONST. OF TANZANIA, art. 9(h) (describing the government’s obligation to
ensure “that all forms of injustice, intimidation, discrimination, corruption, oppression or
favouritism are eradicated”); art. 13(5) (“For the purposes of this Article the expression
‘discriminate’ means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons
on the basis of their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion,
sex or station in life such that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or inferior
and are subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are
treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified
conditions or the prescribed necessary qualifications except that the word ‘discrimination’

344

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15, 315

such language nonetheless prohibit sex discrimination,137 which a
court could construe to constrain the state from discriminating against
homosexuals, as did the Human Rights Committee in Toonen. But the
dominant cultural antagonism toward homosexuality in societies
across the continent may make significant progress through judicial
interpretation of constitutional prohibitions on discrimination as
unlikely as such victories would have been in the United States for
most of its history. In fact, several African constitutions include
explicit exceptions to their fundamental rights provisions when
reasonably necessary to preserve public morality.138 Such provisions
suggest, at the least, a lower probability of a judicial determination
like that of the United States Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas in
its finding that moral disapproval of a practice by a majority of the
population is insufficient grounds for upholding a law prohibiting the
practice.139
The liberal right to equal protection of the law does not, of course,
guarantee freedom from discrimination on any basis whatsoever. If a
state were not able to enact laws and policies that distinguish between
some groups of people for some purposes, an incredibly broad range
of law would be rendered invalid. Governments would be unable, for
example, to implement age restrictions on voting and driving or to
treat unlicensed opticians differently from sellers of ready-to-wear
shall not be construed in a manner that will prohibit the Government from taking
purposeful steps aimed at rectifying disabilities in the society”).
137 See, e.g., CONST. OF GHANA, art. 17(2) (“A person shall not be discriminated
against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion, creed or social or
economic status.”); CONST. OF UGANDA, art. 21(2) (stating that “a person shall not be
discriminated against on the ground of sex, race, colour, ethnic origin, tribe, birth, creed or
religion, social or economic standing, political opinion or disability”); CONST. OF ZAMBIA,
art. 23(3) (“In this Article the expression ‘discriminatory’ mean (sic), affording different
treatment to different persons attributable, wholly or mainly to their respective
descriptions by race, tribe, sex, place of origin, marital status, political opinions color or
creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions
to which persons of another such description are not made subject or are accorded
privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description”).
138 See, e.g., CONST. OF CAMEROON, art. 29(2) (“In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law
solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms
of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general
welfare in a democratic society.”); CONST. OF ETHIOPIA, art. 26(3) (noting that the
government may restrict the right of privacy in the interest of “. . . public peace, public
health and morality. . .”); CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 23(7) (referring to other provisions that
allow limitations when reasonably required “in the interests of defence, public safety,
public order, public morality or public health”).
139 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–78 (2003).(quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
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eyeglasses.140 Instead, courts and scholars have interpreted the right to
equal treatment under the law as a right to be free from unreasonable
discrimination. This inquiry has required two significant
determinations. First, courts must decide whether the person claiming
unlawful discrimination is a member of a group that merits special
protection. The enumeration of prohibited forms of discrimination in
most international human rights documents makes the first
determination straightforward in many cases. However, when
confronting an unenumerated form of discrimination, a court must
determine whether, in the case of an instrument like the ICCPR, it is
possible to bring the group under the umbrella of an explicitly listed
category,141 or, alternatively, whether the group has the kind of “other
status” worthy of special protection. In the United States, where the
Equal Protection Clause does not mention any particular protected
category, the Supreme Court has looked to whether there has been a
history of discrimination against a discrete and insular minority142 on
the basis of an immutable characteristic143 in deciding whether laws
discriminating against the group in question should be subject to
increased scrutiny.
Hence, as mentioned above, discrimination based on some
unremarkable status, like being an unlicensed optician, would be
reasonable so long as the reviewing court finds it rationally related to
any legitimate government purpose, in practice an extremely low bar
to a finding of legitimacy. On the other hand, in the United States, a
law that differentiates on the basis of race, an immutable trait and a
category with an obviously fraught history, including terribly abusive
discrimination, will be subject to strict scrutiny.144 Courts and other
human rights bodies interpreting the requirements of nondiscrimination clauses in treaties and national constitutions might
agree with Judge Walker’s assessment that a law that discriminates on
the basis of sexual orientation is precisely the kind of law to which
something akin to strict scrutiny should apply. As I will discuss
below, however, to the extent that cultural beliefs and anthropological
data undermine claims of immutability and assertions of status as a
discrete, insular minority, such findings are less likely.

140
141
142
143
144

See Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
See, e.g., Toonen, supra note 108.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013).
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Even if a court determines a group is entitled to protected status, it
must ultimately still make a finding on the question of whether a
discriminatory law is reasonable. A law distinguishing between
people on the basis of a suspect classification is less likely to
withstand scrutiny, but its incompatibility with the right to
nondiscrimination is not a foregone conclusion. Hence, although
discrimination on the basis of race is presumptively invalid, there are
limited circumstances in which modern courts have concluded racial
discrimination is reasonable.145 Likewise, a decision that sexual
orientation is a suspect classification might not lead to the inevitable
invalidation of all laws distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals. It could, for example, result in the overturning of laws
that criminalize homosexual activity, as in Toonen, while preserving
prohibitions on homosexual marriage. As of early 2013, although
only ten countries had fully allowed same-sex marriage,146 a much
larger group of nations, including the United States, has
decriminalized consensual sexual relationships between members of
the same sex.147
Ultimately, while international human rights bodies are likely to
continue to interpret international human rights documents as
providing special protection against discrimination for homosexuals,
domestic courts of countries throughout Africa are much less likely to
share that perspective. As I will discuss in further detail below, the
undeveloped framework for enforcement of international human
rights treaties means that, in practice, the perspectives of national
decision-making bodies will prevail in the event of conflict between
the views of a body like the Human Rights Committee and those of
domestic judges and legislators. First, however, I will consider the
145 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding the University of
Michigan Law School’s affirmative action policy because it was necessary to the
compelling government interest in achieving diversity in higher education).
146 WhiteKnot.org, World Map, available at http://whiteknot.org/worldmap.html.
147 States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights have had to
decriminalize homosexual sexual activity since the 1981 decision of the European Court of
Human Rights that such laws violated the Convention’s privacy protections. Dudgeon v.
United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981). In contrast, it was only twenty
years later that the Netherlands became the first country in the world to legalize same-sex
marriage. Act Opening the Institute of Marriage, Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] bk. 1, art.
30(1) (Neth.). The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force in 2009, protects the right to
marriage with no qualifying language that might suggest the right is limited to inter-gender
marriages, and the treaty expressly forbids discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1. In the future, the Treaty of Lisbon
may serve as a basis for further advancement of homosexual marriage rights in Europe.
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development of the second foundational liberal right—the right to
individual autonomy, often framed as a right to privacy.
B. Autonomy
Locke’s belief in the universality of human rationality supported
not only the idea that government must treat people equally, but also
the notion that the state should generally leave people alone. If people
are all essentially rational, then each person is roughly as capable as
the next of deciding how to order his own life, and each person is
likely to be in a better position than anyone else to determine his own
interests and to choose how to pursue his own vision of what
constitutes a good life.148 Like the right to nondiscrimination, United
States constitutional jurisprudence, international human rights
treaties, regional human rights instruments, and the constitutions of
African nations have enshrined the rights to privacy and autonomy.
In the United States, the Declaration of Independence reflected this
liberal value in its affirmation that, like equality of men, it was a selfevident truth that men had unalienable rights, including the right to
“Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.”149 The First and Second
(under current interpretation)150 Amendments to the United States
Constitution safeguard particularized forms of individual autonomy—
the right to freedom of expression and association and the right to
bear arms, respectively. However, the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of a broader, more generalized right to autonomy began in earnest
with the now discredited line of early twentieth century substantive
due process decisions overturning labor laws on the theory that such
laws interfered with the fundamental right to economic liberty.151 The
Supreme Court would later resurrect the concept of substantive due
process to protect unenumerated autonomy rights in a different
context, with its line of privacy cases beginning in the 1960s with
Griswold v. Connecticut.152 These cases upheld as fundamental to
ordered liberty the right to contraceptives for married153 and
148 Robin West, Universalism, Liberal Theory, and the Problem of Gay Marriage, 25
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 705 (1998).
149 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE ¶ 2 (U.S. 1776).
150 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (holding the Second
Amendment creates an individual right to own guns); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S.
3025 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment against the states).
151 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915);
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
152 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
153 Id.
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unmarried people,154 the right to abortion,155 the right to have
children,156 and the right of people of different races to marry each
other.157 Finally, in 2003, the Court in Lawrence used the idea of
substantive due process to invalidate a Texas law that criminalized
sodomy between same-sex couples.158
Just as Judge Walker’s opinion in Perry v. Schwarzenegger
invalidated California’s constitutional prohibition of same-sex
marriage on the ground that it violated the federal Equal Protection
Clause, Judge Walker also held California’s constitutional
amendment infringed the federal substantive due process rights of
homosexual couples.159 Just as the Ninth Circuit had avoided
determining whether homosexuals might be entitled to heightened or
strict scrutiny for equal protection purposes, Judge Reinhardt’s
opinion for the Ninth Circuit eschewed the due process issue
altogether.160 The Supreme Court’s opinion in the case left Judge
Walker’s opinion undisturbed,161 and its opinion in Windsor,
invalidating DOMA, also included substantive due process strands, in
addition to its equal protection and federalism rationales.162
International human rights documents also guarantee autonomy
rights, just as they assert the fundamental right to nondiscrimination.
The UDHR contains numerous provisions proclaiming autonomy
rights, including a right against arbitrary interference with one’s
privacy, family, and home,163 the right to freedom of movement,164 the
right to marry and found a family,165 the right to choose one’s
employment,166 and rights to freedom of religion,167 opinion and

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
156 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
157 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that Virginia’s antimiscegenation law
violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
158 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
159 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.Supp.2d at 995.
160 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d at 1096.
161 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013).
162 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013).
163 UDHR, supra note 97, art. 12.
164 Id. art. 13.
165 Id. art. 16.
166 Id. art. 23.
167 Id. art. 18.
154
155
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expression,168 and association.169 The ICCPR contains many similar
terms.170 While the UDHR and ICCPR’s guarantees of a right to
marry might eventually be interpreted to encompass a right to
homosexual marriage,171 for now, the more generalized protection of
autonomy rights in the documents’ privacy provisions offers greater
potential to shield homosexuals against governmental oppression.
This is so at least in part because of existing precedent. As
mentioned above, the Human Rights Committee’s decision in Toonen
ultimately turned on the determination that the Tasmanian Criminal
Code’s prohibition of private, consensual sexual activity between men
violated Toonen’s privacy rights under Article 17 of the Covenant. Of
course, while the right to marriage is facially narrower than a right
against interference with privacy, family, and home life, a finding that
homosexuals have the right to marry each other would axiomatically
include the kinds of sexual autonomy rights more conventionally
enforced through privacy provisions. Yet, as with equal protection,
the path to marriage rights through autonomy provisions may be more
fraught than claims that criminalization of private sexual conduct
infringes fundamental autonomy or privacy rights.
Like their international counterparts, regional human rights
instruments also include protections of individual autonomy. For
African countries, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
safeguards autonomy rights with provisions analogous to those of
international human rights documents like the UDHR and the
ICCPR.172 Notably, unlike the UDHR and the ICCPR, however, the
African Charter contains no article offering general protection for
Id. art. 19.
Id. art. 20.
170 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 12 (guaranteeing freedom of movement); art.
17 (protecting against arbitrary interference with privacy, family, and home); art. 18
(guaranteeing “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion”); art. 19 (asserting rights to
freedom of opinion and expression); art. 21 (guaranteeing a right to peaceful assembly);
art. 23 (proclaiming the right of “men and women of marriageable age to marry and to
found a family”).
171 The UDHR and ICCPR’s proclamations of a right of “men and women” to marry
might well be interpreted more narrowly, as assuring only that men and women have a
right to marry each other. UDHR, supra note 97, art. 16; ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 23.
Article 16 of the UDHR, specifically notes the right shall be “without any limitation due to
race, nationality or religion,” but does not, of course, mention sexual orientation, a notion
that would not have occurred to the document’s drafters at its inception.
172 African Charter, supra note 130, art. 8 (guaranteeing freedom of conscience and
religion); art. 9 (protecting freedom to hold and express opinions); art. 10 (stating that
individuals have freedom of association); art 11 (proclaiming freedom of assembly); art 12
(describing a right to freedom of movement).
168
169
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privacy or home life. Thus, a decision completely analogous to the
European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Dudgeon v. United
Kingdom that criminalization of homosexual sex violates the
European Convention on Human Rights’ privacy provisions,173 would
be untenable.
In addition to the limitation that individuals owe a duty to exercise
rights with regard to morality and the common interest and the duty of
the state to promote morals and traditional values, several of the
African Charter’s autonomy provisions include specific limitations in
the interests of public welfare or law and order.174 It is conceivable,
however, that the Charter’s articles ensuring freedom of conscience,
expression, and association might someday be construed as offering
protection to homosexuals, like the “penumbras” and “emanations”
from the First Amendment the Griswold Court found supporting the
right of married couples to contraceptive devices.175
Finally, African constitutions include fundamental rights
provisions assuring protection of privacy and autonomy. Like the
international and regional human rights instruments discussed above,
these rights tend to be fairly specifically enumerated, in contrast to the
open-ended possibilities for jurisprudential evolution in the United
States Supreme Court’s line of substantive due process cases.176 And
while the privacy provisions of the UDHR and the ICCPR, with their
references to “privacy, family, and home,” can comfortably
encompass fairly broad autonomy claims, the privacy articles in some
African constitutions appear to target particular categories of privacy
rights with more precision, often with a focus on physical searches of
the home and other interferences with property interests.177 In these
Dudgeon, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 25 (1981).
African Charter, supra note 130, art. 8 (noting the right to freedom of conscience is
subject to “law and order”); art. 9 (stating that the right to freedom of opinion and
expression must be “within the law”); art. 10 (asserting that individuals have a right to free
association only if they abide by the law); art. 11 (stating that the right to freedom of
assembly may be restricted “in the interest of national security, the safety, health, ethics
and rights and freedoms of others”).
175 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
176 See, e.g., CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 19 (articulating a right to freedom of thought and
religion); art. 20 (providing for freedom of expression); art. 21 (describing a right to free
assembly and association); art. 22 (stating that “no citizen shall be deprived of his freedom
of movement”).
177 See, e.g., CONST. OF MALAWI, art. 21 (providing protection against searches of
“person, home or property” and “the seizure of private possessions”); CONST. OF
UGANDA, art. 27 (describing a right to privacy of “person, home, and other property,” and
stating that “No person shall be subjected to interference with the privacy of that person’s
home, correspondence, communication or other property”); CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 17(1)
173
174
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countries, direct reliance on privacy protections would likely be more
difficult for claimants asserting unenumerated rights to sexual
autonomy.
Again, one might make a Griswold-like argument, based on
“penumbras” and “emanations” from articles ensuring privacy and
freedom of expression and association. Although the Griswold Court
did not explicitly invoke substantive due process, subsequent cases
made clear that doctrine provided the foundation for the developing
body of American fundamental rights jurisprudence;178 it is
theoretically possible that some African courts might be willing to use
similar doctrinal innovation to proclaim unenumerated rights.
Nonetheless, African courts have not tended to develop similarly
convenient mechanisms for extrapolation of general, fundamental
rights from more specific constitutional provisions. As a consequence,
practitioners of same-sex intimacies in many African countries might
face obstacles to constitutional autonomy arguments even if judges in
those countries were predisposed to be sympathetic to their claims.
As with equal protection, not all autonomy claims attract the kind
of elevated scrutiny that increases the odds that a law impinging on
the asserted right will fail to withstand judicial review. In the United
States, for example, substantive due process claims merit strict
scrutiny only if the right at issue is considered fundamental, a
standard the United States Supreme Court finds satisfied when there
is a “careful description of the asserted fundamental liberty
interest;”179 when the claimed right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition,”180 “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of
our people as to be ranked as fundamental;”181 and when the right is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” such that “neither liberty
nor justice would exist” without it.182 Whether courts in the United
States and elsewhere will examine homosexual marriage claims and
(“Except with his own consent, no person shall be subjected to the search of his person or
his property or the entry by others on his premises”); but see CONST. OF CAMEROON, art.
12 (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence”); CONST. OF KENYA, art. 31 (including protection of information relating
to “family or private affairs”); CONST. OF TANZANIA, art. 16(1) (stating that “[e]very
person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his own person, his
family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private
communications”).
178 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
179 Id. at 721 (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
180 Id. (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
181 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
182 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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sexual autonomy claims based on fundamental rights provisions using
strict scrutiny, or something like strict scrutiny, will depend in large
part on how narrowly those courts define the right at stake.
If one characterizes the ostensible right as a right to gay marriage,
for example, then it becomes considerably more difficult to argue the
right is deeply rooted in tradition and history. On the other hand, if
courts are willing to classify the right at stake more broadly, as a right
to choose one’s spouse, such contentions are more plausible.
Likewise, claims of rights to sexual autonomy, broadly speaking, are
more likely to be found to be deeply rooted in tradition than claims of
rights to homosexual sexual intimacy. Of course, a court’s
determination on how to frame the claimed right is likely to depend
largely on the outcome the judges deciding the case favor.183 So far, in
any case, courts around the world have been significantly more likely
to afford protection against governmental proscription of consensual
sexual intimacy than to find a fundamental right to homosexual
marriage.184
And as with equal protection, even a finding that the right in
question is fundamental, thus requiring something like strict scrutiny,
does not definitively lead to invalidation of any law that places
restrictions on the right. Thus, a court might find a fundamental right
to sexual autonomy or to marriage, but might then conclude that
restrictions aimed at homosexuals are reasonable in light of
compelling governmental interests.185 These sorts of restrictive
findings are, of course, more likely in a society culturally predisposed
to disfavor homosexuality.
Finally, as already discussed, fundamental rights provisions in
African constitutions often include specific public-interest exceptions,
183 The United States Supreme Court engaged in just such a debate in Lawrence. In his
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy sidestepped the question of whether the rights at stake
were “deeply rooted” in the country’s history and traditions and whether strict scrutiny
was the applicable standard, but described the claimed right fairly broadly, as a right to
“private sexual conduct.” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). Scalia’s dissent,
on the other hand, described the asserted right more narrowly, as a right to “homosexual
sodomy,” and noted the majority did not even try to claim that right was “deeply rooted”
in history and tradition. Id. at 594. In Bowers, the majority had framed the issue in
similarly narrow terms, as a question of whether “the Constitution confers a fundamental
right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy . . .” Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190
(1986).
184 See supra notes 146–47 and accompanying text.
185 Such a finding would be inconsistent with Justice Kennedy’s analysis in Lawrence,
in which he held the government had no rational basis, let alone a compelling interest, in
criminalizing homosexual sex. Nonetheless, it is certain that not all jurists would agree
with Kennedy’s reasoning.
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including exceptions for the enforcement of moral norms.186 Although
the United States Supreme Court held that moral disapproval of
homosexual activity by a majority of the population was insufficient
to justify upholding a law criminalizing such activity,187 and although
the Human Rights Committee rejected the Tasmanian argument that
criminalization of homosexual sex was justified to preserve public
health and morals,188 it is likely that many African courts would be
more receptive to such contentions.189 In African countries with more
generalized privacy protections in their constitutions, and without
explicit limitations for things like public morality, privacy claims
might be more likely avenues for advancing the rights of
homosexuals. Even in such countries, however, prevailing cultural
norms make such claims significantly less likely to succeed than in
Western societies. I will discuss the reasons for this contention in
further detail in Part IV.
C. Enforcement
Even if one concludes that international human rights law supports
privacy and nondiscrimination rights protecting homosexuals, the
problem of enforcement of those rights, like the problem of
enforcement of international law more broadly, remains a serious
obstacle to realization of any improvement in the status of
homosexuals in Africa. The Human Rights Committee’s powers are
limited for several important reasons. First, only states that have
ratified the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR have accepted the
Committee’s authority to offer opinions on complaints from
individuals claiming their rights have been violated. Although 114
nations have acceded to the First Optional Protocol, many of the
countries that have failed to offer homosexuals the full range of rights
available to heterosexuals have not, including the United States and
numerous countries in Africa with discriminatory laws.190 Even if a

186 See, e.g., CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 17(2) (stating that, notwithstanding the Article’s
first clause prohibiting searches without consent, government conduct will not contravene
the Article if it is reasonably required in the “interests of defence, public safety, public
order, public morality, public health . . .” or to protect the “rights and freedoms of other
persons”).
187 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78.
188 Toonen, supra note 108.
189 See infra Part IV.
190 United Nations Treaty Collection: First Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx
?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en.
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country endorses the First Optional Protocol, the Protocol provides
that any party to it may denounce the Protocol with written notice,
though without prejudice to communications received before the
effective date of denunciation.191 Ultimately, the Human Rights
Committee’s authority is limited by the failure to establish any
sanction whatsoever for failing to comply with its recommendations.
In fact, as noted above, the Committee’s opinions are not formally
binding at all.192 This is so even for those countries that have acceded
to the First Optional Protocol.193
Although Australia responded to the Committee’s report in Toonen
by passing federal legislation to overturn the Tasmanian law and
prohibiting the passage of future similar laws,194 Australia was in a
somewhat unusual position in its sympathy for the complainant and
refusal to support the Tasmanian government’s law before the
Committee. In response to the complaint, Australia had conceded the
Tasmanian law arbitrarily interfered with Toonen’s privacy rights,
was not justified on public health or morals grounds, and that if “other
status” could be read to include sexual orientation, the Tasmanian law
unjustifiably discriminated against homosexuals.195 At the time,
Tasmania was the only state in Australia that continued to criminalize
homosexual conduct.196
Even if a country has not ratified the First Optional Protocol, the
Human Rights Committee has the competence to review regular
reports by states parties to the ICCPR on the status of their
compliance with the Covenant and to hear complaints between states
parties to the Covenant.197 Again, however, the Committee has no
191 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res.. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16 at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999
U.N.T.S. 302, art. 12.FN 192.
192 See Toonen, supra note 108.
193 Michael J. Dennis, Application of Human Rights Treaties Extraterritorially in Times
of Armed Conflict and Military Occupation, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 119, 127 (2005) (noting
that Article 5(4) of the Protocol provides the Committee with authority only to “forward
its views to the State Party concerned and to the individual”); c.f. Darina Makova, Chapter
19 Human Rights in Times of Global Inequalities: A View from Slovakia, 16 IUS GENTIUM
325, 329 (2012) (describing the ICCPR, “when taken with its 1st Optional Protocol,” as
“substantially binding and practically enforceable”).
194 See Gus Bernardi, From Conflict to Convergence: The Evolution of Tasmanian
Anti-Discrimination Law, 7(1) AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 134 (2001).
195 Toonen, supra note 108.
196 Id.
197 Human Rights Committee: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr
.org/english/bodies/hrc/.
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power to sanction states it determines to be in violation of their
obligations under the Covenant. Ultimately, states parties to the
ICCPR are bound by the text of the Covenant, rather than by
decisions of the Human Rights Committee,198 and states whose judges
are predisposed against homosexuality will be less likely to interpret
the ICCPR’s language as providing protection for homosexual rights.
The ICESCR faces similar enforcement problems.
Likewise, even if a UN member state fails entirely to cooperate
with the Human Rights Council’s UPR, there is no definite sanction.
Rather, the Council “would decide on the measures it would need to
take in case of persistent non-co-operation.”199 Enforcement problems
have also plagued the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,
given the nonbinding status of the Commission’s recommendations.200
Moreover, without state consent, individuals are not empowered to
bring claims before the African Court on Human and Peoples’
Rights.201
In light of the limited capacity for implementation of human rights
norms outside the machinery of a state justice system, the ICCPR
itself recognizes the important role of states parties in its statement of
the obligation of national governments to give effect to rights
recognized under the Covenant.202 The ICESCR contains a similar
provision.203 Of course, reliance on member nations to give effect to
treaty rights leaves such nations with considerable practical power to
198 See, e.g., Laurence R. Helfer & Alice M. Miller, Sexual Orientation and Human
Rights: Toward a United States and Transnational Jurisprudence, 9 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
61, 82 (1996).
199 Basic Facts About the UPR, OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER
FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/BasicFacts.aspx.
200 See, e.g., Frans Viljoen & Lirette Louw, State Compliance With the
Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 1994–2004,
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2007) (finding a general lack of state compliance with the nonbinding recommendations of the Commission).
201 Article 34(6) of the protocol establishing the Court requires states parties to accept
the competence of the court to hear claims from individuals and Non-Governmental
Organizations in order for the Court to hear such claims. Protocol to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 9, 1998, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/665 (entered into force
Jan. 1, 2004). As of early 2013, only six African nations (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali,
Malawi, Rwanda, and Tanzania) had chosen to allow individual claims against them in the
Court. Rwanda Deposits the Declaration Allowing Individuals Direct Access to the Court,
AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS, Feb. 28, 2013, http://www.african
-court.org/en/index.php/news/latest-news/341-rwanda-deposits-the-article-34-6-declara
tion-allowing-individuals-and-ngos-direct-access-to-the-african-court.
202 ICCPR, supra note 100, art. 2.
203 ICESCR, supra note 101, art. 3.
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interpret the nature of the rights at stake. Given pervasive obstacles to
the enforcement of international law generally, and given the lack of
any specific enforcement mechanism for international human rights
treaties in particular, appeals to international human rights norms to
promote the interests of homosexuals in Africa currently have limited
potential for success.
Favorable decisions from domestic courts in Africa also seem
unlikely. As others have observed in the American context, contrary
to the popular mythology of courts as staunch defenders of minority
rights against majoritarian oppression, courts seldom declare rights
that lack significant public support.204 On the occasions when courts
do find rights when there is substantial public disagreement on the
issue, backlash to judicial interference with the political process may
lead to subversion of the very rights courts hoped to protect.205 The
widespread public disapproval of homosexuality in Africa suggests
African courts are unlikely to issue sweeping decisions to protect
homosexual rights. Even if African courts did issue such rulings,
moreover, lack of African public support for homosexual rights
suggests the possibility for political backlash that could endanger
people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa more than
current laws criminalizing homosexual conduct. These conclusions
seem apparent even without any deeper examination of ideas outside
the liberal legal paradigm or of cultural context. However, both queer
theory and communitarian philosophy, and the coincidence of those
ideologies with much of the African anthropological record, suggest
more powerful reasons both to discount the likelihood of favorable
204 See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theory, 90
VA. L. REV. 1537, 1551–52 (2004) (arguing that courts tend to protect minority rights only
when national majorities approve of such protection); Barry Friedman, The Importance of
Being Positive: The Nature and Function of Judicial Review, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1257,
1279 (2004) (arguing that the United States Supreme Court “operates on a leash” that
ensures its decisions will hew fairly closely to public opinion); Michael J. Klarman, Brown
and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. REV. 431, 445 (2005) [hereinafter Klarman,
Brown and Lawrence]. Adem K Abebe, Abdication of Responsibility or Justifiable Fear of
Illegitimacy? The Death Penalty, Gay Rights, and the Role of Public Opinion in Judicial
Determinations in Africa, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 603, 620–26 (2012) (Adem Abebe has
observed that in the few cases in which African courts have considered rights-based claims
by practitioners of same-sex intimacies, most of those courts have relied heavily on public
opinion in rejecting the claims.).
205 Ruth Bader Ginsburg has argued, for example, that Roe v. Wade produced backlash
that has made abortion reform more difficult. Emily Bazelon, Backlash Whiplash: Is
Justice Ginsburg Right that Roe v. Wade Should Make the Court Cautious About Gay
Marriage?, SLATE, May 14, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics
/jurisprudence/2013/05/justice_ginsburg_and_roe_v_wade_caution_for_gay_marriage
.html.
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judicial opinions and to credit the possibility of severe popular
backlash to outside pressure for homosexual rights in Africa.
III
CRITIQUES OF LIBERALISM
The poorly developed framework for the enforcement of
international human rights law suggests practical limitations on
improving the lives of homosexuals in Africa, but there are other
reasons for liberals to consider exercising restraint in pursuing a
homosexual rights agenda in Africa. There are always risks to
pursuing a liberal agenda in a culture other than one’s own, yet
Professor Uday Metha’s observation of an exclusionary impulse
inherent to classical liberal ideology may suggest interventionist
tendencies are inextricably entwined with liberal theory. In Mehta’s
estimation, despite the universalism at the core of liberal philosophy,
liberalism’s exclusionary potential was apparent even in Locke’s
articulations of the distinction between “universal capacities and the
conditions for their actualization.”206 In particular, Mehta has claimed
a discrepancy between Locke’s assertion of the natural and universal
capacity for reason, which individuals might use to ascertain the
natural laws that restrict otherwise complete human freedom, and the
highly structured process Locke envisioned for inculcating this
universal rationality in children in his Thoughts Concerning
Education.207 Thus, having described reason as universal and natural,
Locke nonetheless endorsed the notion that certain members of
society (children) could be excluded from access to the full range of
liberal rights until society had imparted rationality to them through a
highly regimented educational curriculum.208 Mehta has also noted
Locke’s frequent approving references to conventional social
hierarchies that impose limitations on the theoretically universal
access to liberal rights he proclaimed.209 In Thoughts Concerning
Education, for example, Locke wrote, “I think a Prince, a Nobleman
and an ordinary Gentleman’s son, should have different ways of
breeding.”210 And of course, for Locke, there were some members of
206 Uday S. Mehta, Liberal Strategies of Exclusion, in TENSIONS OF EMPIRE:
COLONIAL CULTURES IN A BOURGEOIS WORLD 62 (Frederick Cooper & Ann L. Stole
eds., 1997).
207 Id. at 67–70.
208 Id. at 67 (citing LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, ¶ 60).
209 Id. at 69.
210 Id. at 67 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, SOME THOUGHTS CONCERNING EDUCATION
section 217).
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society—“lunaticks and ideots”211—whom the majority could
permanently govern without consent.
But for Mehta, the imperialist potential of liberalism was most
evident in the writing of John Stuart Mill.212 Although Mill insisted
that liberty was necessary for human flourishing,213 Mill believed in
limiting access to liberty not only for children and lunatics, but also
for societies that had not developed sufficiently to be “improved by
free and equal discussion.”214 Thus, despite Mill’s belief in the
universal human sense of dignity, and the capacity for choice as a
“distinctive endowment of a human being,” he endorsed despotic
colonial rule over what he considered barbarous cultures. Mill
justified authoritarian rule by contrasting societies that were “capable
and ripe for representative government” like Australia and the
American colonies, with others, like India, that were “still a great
distance from that state.”215
More generally, Mehta has noted that liberal universalism leads to
an urge to “politically . . . assimilate things, even when those things
are thoroughly unfamiliar.”216 This “cosmopolitanism of reason” leads
liberals to describe the unknown in generalities, which, “in a single
glance and without having experienced any of it . . . make[s] it
possible to compare and classify the world.”217 Mehta’s observation
of the liberal urge toward political assimilation perfectly describes
insistence by many Western liberals on engrafting Western
homosexual identity onto all practitioners of same-sex intimacies. But
this epistemological perspective results, in Mehta’s view, in an urge
to dominate other cultures, for “the language of those comparisons is
not neutral and cannot avoid notions of superiority and inferiority,
backward and progressive, and higher and lower.”218
Of course, current liberal calls for advancement of homosexual
rights in Africa are arguably a far cry from the colonial policies of an
invading empire. The publicity campaigns of human rights groups
today do not bolster physical occupations by foreign powers, the way
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT II, ¶ 60).
Mehta, supra note 206 at 70–80.
213 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
214 Id.
215 Mehta, supra note 206, at 76 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 214 (1861)).
216 UDAY S. MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY
BRITISH LIBERAL THOUGHT 20 (1999).
217 Id.
218 Id.
211
212
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that European nations used abolition of the slave trade to justify their
nineteenth-century colonial enterprises.219 And conditioning
dispensation of monetary assistance on protection of a vulnerable
minority seems far removed from using the notion of cultural
inferiority to rationalize occupation, wealth extraction, and the
wholesale subjugation of populations that characterized the colonial
experience.
On the other hand, the push for legal Westernization has gone hand
in hand with pressure from international institutions like the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund for developing countries to
move toward economic liberalization,220 thereby creating new
investment opportunities for the West, and others. In theory, the
economic liberalization implemented through World Bank-imposed
structural adjustment programs will lead developing countries out of
poverty.221 The attendant Western systems call for legal
liberalization—the reshaping of non-Western legal systems to fit
American and European conceptions of justice—compliments that
economic liberalization; without such legal reform, the theory goes,
developing countries will be unable to attract the investment that is
crucial to increasing their wealth, and, of course, the wealth of
investors in their newly open economies.222
Yet even if one is disinclined to read mixed motives into the
appeals of human rights activists, there are important reasons for
liberals to proceed with caution. As Professor Thomas Kelley has
chronicled, Western pressure for liberal legal reform in developing
countries may result in outcomes at odds with reformers’ intentions.
In a devastating account, Kelley described the plight of Niger’s
horso.223 Descendents of chattel slaves who hold a status difficult to
describe in Western terms, horso have traditionally farmed land
remitted to them by village nobles, paying for the privilege with a
portion of their harvests.224 Although, unlike their ancestors, horso
have a great deal of freedom, they hold a permanent child-like status
219 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kelley, Unintended Consequences of Legal Westernization in
Niger: Harming Contemporary Slaves by Reconceptualizing Property, 56 AM. J. COMP. L.
999, n.52 (2008) [hereinafter Kelley, Slavery].
220 See, e.g., Thomas A. Kelley, Exporting Western Law to the Developing World: The
Troubling Case of Niger, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 321, 322 (2007) [hereinafter
Kelley, Exporting Western Law].
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 Kelley, Slavery, supra note 219.
224 Id. at 1013–16.
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in the communities in which they live, always dependent on noble
elders for permission to cultivate land.225 As Kelley has described, a
combination of recent, Western-inspired property reforms and antislavery provisions has, ironically, had significant negative impacts for
Niger’s horso. First, antislavery provisions in Niger’s constitution and
penal code, defining slavery in Western terms as involving “powers
attaching to the right of ownership,” are unfamiliar in a culture in
which all individuals owe duties to, and exert some ownership-like
claims over, other members of the communities in which they live.226
However, these provisions have led some nobles to assert that they
neither own horso nor owe them any further duties, including the
protection and care they have traditionally felt obligated to offer.227
Second, property reforms aimed at ensuring clear titles to land,
eviscerating communal ownership to ensure alienability, have led
nobles to assert sole ownership claims over land they had traditionally
ceded for horso use, leaving horso communities isolated and
defenseless.228
Kelley’s powerful account of the plight of the horso followed his
earlier and more generalized admonitions about the possible
unintended consequences of Western legal reform in the developing
world.229 Given the depth of Western misunderstanding of African
culture, Western efforts to advance homosexual rights in Africa could
also lead to unanticipated results.
While the range of critiques of liberalism is too extensive to
catalogue here, two responses to the liberal legal perspective—
communitarianism and queer theory—are particularly relevant to any
investigation of African resistance to gay rights. These philosophies,
along with the African anthropological record, can help explain why
African countries, which tend to have constitutions that espouse the
same liberal values as the constitutions of Western nations, might be
so much less likely than their Western counterparts to interpret
fundamental rights provisions as protecting homosexuals.
Communitarian theory, which embraces elevation of community
norms over individual interests, coincides with the values of a broad
array of African cultures and helps elucidate the likely obstacles
homosexual rights advocates will face in Africa. While
225
226
227
228
229

Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1023–25.
Id. at 1026–34.
Id. at 1034.
Kelley, Exporting Western Law, supra note 220.
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communitarian theory can shed some light on African resistance to
both autonomy and equality claims of homosexual rights advocates,
the anti-essentialist assertions of queer theorists have significant
implications in particular for liberal claims based on rights against
discrimination. If, as queer theorists contend, sexuality is primarily a
social construction, then assertions that homosexuals have the kind of
minority status that merits protection against discriminatory conduct
become less tenable. Similarly, if the consequence of the malleability
and variability of desire is that many Africans who engage in what
Westerners would term homosexual conduct consider that conduct a
relatively insignificant component not only of their overall identities,
but an unimportant component even of their sexual identities, then
claims to the kind of suspect status that might confer legal protection
against discrimination become more difficult. As I will discuss in Part
V, much of the anthropological data from across the African continent
supports the anti-essentialist arguments of queer theorists.
The claims of communitarians and queer theorists, and the
consistency of those claims with cultural data across the African
continent, should be important to anyone committed to a liberal
perspective. These assertions, and their affirmation in African culture,
offer insight on the likely depth of African backlash against liberal
arguments for homosexual rights. The perspectives of
communitarians and queer theorists also offer the possibility of a
deeper understanding of the context for African assertions about
homosexuality. In turn, such an understanding may assist homosexual
rights advocates in pursuing a more successful agenda for improving
the lives of Africans who engage in same-sex intimacies.
A. Communitarian Philosophy and African Culture
Given that African constitutions tend to enshrine liberal
commitments similar to their Western counterparts, one might
reasonably wonder why African citizens, legislators, and judges
would be any less likely than their Western counterparts to uphold the
liberal values inherent to the claims of homosexual rights advocates.
A simple and obvious answer is that many African cultures remain
significantly less sympathetic to homosexuality than most Western
cultures, which have had a rapid evolution in perspective on
homosexuality and homosexual rights. Yet this answer, by itself, is
insufficient. If, in fact, the constitutions of African countries represent
a wholehearted commitment to liberal values, then those constitutions
should guide the judges who interpret them to separate the right from
the good, upholding the former by striking down laws that represent
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popular sentiment concerning the latter. Liberalism, that is, does not
allow majoritarian interference with individual decisions about how to
pursue a happy life in the absence of significant interference with the
rights of others.230
What, then, explains illiberal decision-making by authorities with
ostensibly liberal commitments? Communitarian philosophy and the
communitarian ideals of many African cultures offer a partial
response. Instead of espousing a separation of the right from the good,
communitarians embrace the use of law to promote the good, the
specifics of which will vary depending on the values of the society in
question. In fact, the broader communitarian critique of liberalism
denies the very possibility of rights (either to autonomy or to equal
protection) that exist outside of, and precede, the communities in
which liberals make their claims.231
At times, Western courts have also embraced community values
over liberal rights. Justice White’s majority opinion in Bowers, for
example, explicitly endorsed the idea that moral opprobrium was
sufficient to validate Georgia’s sodomy law.232 Chief Justice Burger’s
concurrence also embraced this idea in his statement that protecting
homosexual sodomy as a fundamental right “would be to cast aside
millennia of moral teaching.”233 Likewise, even today, and even in the
realm of sexual autonomy, a right the United States Supreme Court
has held deserving of special protection, illiberal laws prohibiting
practices like polygamy and prostitution remain intact. Indeed, the
very notion that liberal rights must give way to compelling state
interests in the United States’ equal protection and fundamental rights
jurisprudence
arguably
represents
a
concession
to
230 The most famous expression of this idea is John Stuart Mill’s harm principle,
discussed in On Liberty. One might argue that, in fact, the rights homosexuals seek to
enforce have serious, detrimental third-party impacts. Of course, the Platonic liberal ideal
of the atomistic individual pursuing her ambitions in a vacuum, with no consequences for
the lives of third parties, has never been a reality. Every significant decision one makes
impacts other lives. Taken to an extreme, this argument could negate every liberal
autonomy claim. Communitarian theorists have made just such arguments to illustrate the
putative illusory nature of liberal arguments.
231 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF
POLITICAL DISCOURSE 137–38 (1991) (“The myriad associations that generate social
norms are the invisible supports of, and the sine qua non for, a regime in which individuals
have rights.”); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE
HUMAN SCIENCES 206 (1985) (claiming “that the free individual of the West is only what
he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which
nourishes him.”); Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 444.
232 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
233 Id. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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communitarianism.234 Certainly, the question in substantive due
process cases of whether a right is “deeply rooted” in the country’s
“history and tradition” suggests the relevance of community values in
determining the significance of a claim. And as Michael Sandel has
argued, before the turn of the twentieth century, the Bill of Rights
offered little actual protection for individual rights against the federal
government. Instead, Americans and their courts tended to conceive
of liberty as requiring a “dispersion of power among branches and
levels of government”235 rather than elevation of individual rights
over community norms. Yet it is clear now that the liberal,
individualist perspective is deeply rooted, both in American culture
generally and in American legal culture.
In contrast, communitarian values have played a far more
significant role in the actual implementation of law and policy in
many African nations than in the Western countries whose
constitutions often provided templates for their African counterparts.
This practical disparity between liberal constitutional language and
law in action reflects the communitarian ethics of a broad range of
traditional African societies, and it illuminates, to some extent,
African resistance to the full range of liberalism’s implications. I will
discuss the African context more thoroughly below. First, however, I
will provide an overview of communitarian philosophy and
communitarian critiques of liberalism.
Communitarian philosophers tend to attack liberalism on two
grounds. First, communitarians contend that liberal claims are
conceptually incoherent, that exclusion of moral judgments from
public decision-making is neither practically nor theoretically
possible.236 Second, communitarians make the normative claim that
liberal attempts to separate the right and the good are undesirable, for

234 One might argue these limitations are consistent with a liberal framework, given
consequences for other individuals or the community at large. Again, Mill’s harm
principle bounds the right to individual autonomy. Of course, without further qualification,
the harm principle has no stopping point (all actions have third-party impacts) and could
eviscerate liberalism’s core commitments. Nonetheless, interference with the rights of
others has always been a sufficient justification for limiting rights in a liberal universe, and
the idea of compelling state interests inherently involves questions of public import.
235 SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10, at 38.
236 See, e.g., Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 444 (citing
Thomas Moody, Some Comparisons Between Liberalism and Eccentric
Communitarianism, in THE LIBERALISM-COMMUNITARIANISM DEBATE 91, 96 (C.F.
Delaney ed., 1994); Michael J. Sandel, Introduction, in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 1
(Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984) (stating that “[t]oleration and freedom and fairness are
values too”).
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they diminish the important function of communities in promoting
public goods and individual freedom and dignity.237
Communitarians have rightly observed that liberal philosophy
offers an inadequate account of the manner in which courts actually
make decisions. In the context of homosexual rights, for example,
courts purporting to act as neutral arbiters have, in fact, engaged in
overt moral analysis. Sandel illustrated this point in his discussion of
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,238 in which the
Massachusetts Supreme Court found a right to homosexual marriage.
In her majority opinion, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall claimed
moral neutrality in noting the irrelevance of the competing moral
viewpoints that marriage should be between only men and women
and that members of the same sex should be permitted to marry.239
Nonetheless, Marshall’s opinion then went on to define the essence of
marriage as involving an exclusive, permanent commitment between
partners, 240 whether the individuals in question are heterosexual or
homosexual. Of course, Marshall’s choice to favor one faction in the
contest over the social meaning of marriage almost certainly reflects
her moral perspective, a decision to promote a particular conception
of the boundaries within which individuals in society should be
permitted to pursue the good life.241 Yet, as Sandel noted, “[i]f
government were truly neutral on the moral worth of all voluntary
intimate relationships, the state would have no grounds for limiting
marriage to two persons, consensual polygamous partnerships would
also qualify.”242
Ultimately, communitarians suggest the very idea of liberal moral
neutrality is an illusion. Promotion of the core liberal tenets of
equality and autonomy itself represents a moral judgment that those
ideals are more important than alternative values, like social welfare,
community solidarity, or civic responsibility.243 If the liberal concept
of moral neutrality is practically and conceptually impossible, the
237 See, e.g., Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 445 (citing
Markate Daly, Introduction, in COMMUNTARIANISM: A NEW PUBLIC ETHICS xvii
(Markate Daly ed., 1994) (contending that “[i]nstead of such values as individual interests,
autonomy, and universality, natural rights, and neutrality, communitarian philosophy is
framed in terms of the common good, social practices and traditions, character, solidarity,
and social responsibility)).
238 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
239 Id. at 948.
240 Id. at 961.
241 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 258–59 (2009).
242 Id. at 257.
243 See, e.g., Sandel, Introduction, supra note 236, at 1.
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liberal promotion of the atomistic individual, making choices in a
social vacuum, free from social obligation, is also undesirable,
according to communitarian arguments. Instead, communitarians
suggest the state should embrace its unavoidable role of promoting
the good, a concept developed and defined through community
norms.
Sandel, perhaps the most prominent communitarian critic of
liberalism,244 began arguing with his first book that liberalism’s
glorification of individual rights had diminished the sense of meaning
in people’s lives and that any complete theory of justice must take
account of the role of communities and of community obligations in
shaping individuals.245 According to critics like Sandel, the liberal
focus on individual autonomy has undervalued the important role
communities can play in promoting the welfare of the individuals who
comprise them. The pervasive impact of the liberal perspective on
every facet of American life and culture has, furthermore, had a
disheartening impact on individuals as their identities as members of
communities have been cut off from their identities as democratic
citizens.246 In the final analysis, according to Sandel, the triumph of
liberalism has left communities weakened and unresponsive to the
needs of now isolated, disenchanted citizens.247
The ultimate “good” Sandel proposes as an alternative to the moral
void of liberal neutrality is the idea of civic republicanism, the
promotion of greater engagement with and participation in
government by citizens. In contrast to liberalism’s ostensible moral
neutrality and focus on the self-interested individual, making choices
about how to pursue happiness in the absence of external obligation,
the civic republican model promotes its particular conception of the
good—a society in which public spiritedness and regard for public

244 Although Sandel has generally been associated with communitarian theory, Sandel
distinguishes his “perfectionist” philosophy from communitarian ideology. The crux of
Sandel’s distinction is that perfectionism involves governmental promotion of the good, as
defined with reference to intrinsic moral value, rather than simply to community norms.
The aims of a perfectionist model are thus independent of widespread support from any
particular community. MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE xi
(1982). Sandel’s conception of the good, however, emphasizes the moral value of
communities, which can promote individual freedom and provide meaning to individual
lives, as opposed to the moral vacuum of liberal tolerance.
245 Id.
246 SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10, at 321–24.
247 Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 465.

366

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15, 315

welfare predominate over the bracketed concerns of atomistic
individuals.248
In arguing for the potential of communities to enrich and enhance
the lives of individuals, Sandel emphasizes the crucial role that black
churches played in advancing the civil rights movement in the 1960s.
The fruits of that movement included obvious victories for the liberal
values of individual autonomy and choice, including the end of
government segregation and the attainment of voting rights for blacks.
Yet the collective, communal efforts that went into obtaining those
freedoms represent, for Sandel, a higher-order freedom, which results
from collective engagement to influence public life.249
In contrast to Sandel’s identification of a specific moral aim, other
communitarians have argued for promotion of norms intrinsic only to
communities of the governed. Michael Walzer’s communitarian
vision, for example, eschews the idea of any moral framework
external to community values, but urges distribution of social goods
in a manner consistent with the meanings a community has chosen to
ascribe to those goods.250 According to Walzer, for any social good in
any society, there are accepted principles for determining how to
distribute the good.251 Each good or set of goods, moreover, has
distributive standards that differ from those of other social goods.252
Walzer’s notion of “complex equality” thus requires that society
allocate each social good according to the community’s shared
understandings of the good’s significance and without intrusion of
criteria from other spheres.253 For example, if community tradition
defines politics as a sphere separate from the market, then money
should not influence the distribution of political power. Likewise,
political power should not confer advantages in the marketplace.
Communitarian responses to liberalism offer some potential for
advancement of minority rights. As Robin West has urged, liberal
universalism’s insistence on equality, which entails fundamental
denial of difference, deprives those seeking to improve the lives of
minorities of powerful arguments that might aid their cases.254 In the
case of homosexual marriage, West noted that acceptance of a liberal
See generally SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10.
Id. at 348.
250 See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY (1983).
251 Id. at 6–10.
252 Id. at 10.
253 Id. at 12–13.
254 West, supra note 148.
248
249
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framework has led homosexual rights advocates to contend that
homosexual marriage is indistinguishable from heterosexual marriage
and that the right is, therefore, fundamental regardless of the genders
of those wishing to exercise it.255 Aside from the empirical
awkwardness of the denial of difference, West suggested that denial
also preempts useful claims about the ways that the differences
between heterosexual and homosexual marriage militate in favor of
recognition of the latter.256
In the absence of liberal constraints, for example, one might pursue
government approval of same-sex marriage by emphasizing that
homosexual marriage, unlike heterosexual marriage, lacks the
patriarchal heritage of subjugation of women and represents, instead,
a partnership of sexual equals.257 Additionally, West proposes that
proponents of homosexual marriage might embrace the claim of gay
marriage opponents that homosexual marriage is fundamentally
different from heterosexual marriage because of its lack of procreative
potential. Instead of engaging in the liberal denial of difference by
pointing to heterosexual unions between sterile partners, gay marriage
advocates might note that the inability of homosexual couples to
reproduce suggests a more altruistic union, based only on mutual love
and respect, as opposed to the fundamentally selfish aim of
propagating one’s genes.258 Finally, West contends the liberal focus
on legally and morally unencumbered individual decision-makers
simply belies the fundamentally communal nature of an institution
like marriage.259
More broadly, the liberal requirement of moral neutrality prevents
a wide range of arguments that might be useful in promoting minority
interests. By requiring tolerance of individual choice, without regard
to the moral significance of the choices in question, the liberal
paradigm preempts exposition of the positive good that promoting
minority interests might entail. In this regard, Sandel criticized the
dissenting opinions of Justices Blackmun and Stevens in Bowers. In
Griswold, the Court had, while advancing the liberal cause,
nonetheless embraced a moral perspective in its judgment on the
fundamental value of marriage as “intimate to the degree of being
sacred . . . an association that promotes a way of life . . . an
255
256
257
258
259

Id. at 726.
Id. at 727–28.
Id.
Id. at 728.
Id. at 729.

368

OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15, 315

association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.”260 According to Sandel, Blackmun and Stevens missed an
opportunity to cast homosexual relationships in similar terms.261
Instead, Blackmun emphasized the liberal aspects of the Court’s
earlier opinions,262 and both Blackmun and Stevens stressed the
importance of individual choice in arguing for the invalidation of
Georgia’s law.263 Yet, in Sandel’s view, this insistence on liberal
neutrality results in only a “thin and fragile toleration.”264 It leads
merely to the idea that one has to put up with homosexuals despite
disliking them, “just like we have to tolerate all degenerates.”265
Notwithstanding the potential of the communitarian embrace of
moral arguments to advance minority interests, I have suggested there
are good reasons to adhere to a liberal framework. With a true
communitarian perspective, including disavowal of the very idea of
rights external to community norms, there is no guarantee that the
values of the community will promote minority welfare. By
definition, in fact, communal priorities will reflect majority interests.
Walzer’s notion of “complex equality,” moreover, is insufficient to
protect minorities. A follower of Walzer’s philosophy might argue,
for example, that homosexuals must be permitted to marry because
the shared community understanding of marriage is that it is a union
of two individuals choosing to commit their lives to each other based
on mutual feelings of love, attraction, and respect. Under this
understanding, the genders of the individuals in question should be
irrelevant. Yet, as others have pointed out, Walzer’s theory offers an
insufficient account of the deeply contested meanings of every

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10, at 103–08.
262 Id. at 104–05 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)).
263 Blackmun had noted that “much of the richness of a relationship will come from the
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely personal
bonds.” Id. Similarly, Stevens had written of “respect for the dignity of individual choice”
and the interest one has, regardless of sexual orientation, in “deciding how he will live his
own life, and, more narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary
associations with his companions.” Id. at 105 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 218–19
(Stevens, J., dissenting)).
264 Michael Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration, in AMITAI ATZIONI, ED.,
NEW COMMUNITARIAN THINKING: PERSONS, VIRTUES, INSTITUTIONS, AND
COMMUNITIES 86 (1995).
265 R. CLAIRE SNYDER, GAY MARRIAGE AND DEMOCRACY: EQUALITY FOR ALL 140
(2006).
260
261
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significant social good.266 Why, for example, should decision makers
prioritize the notion of marriage that emphasizes romantic choice over
the vision of the institution as involving the union only of partners of
the opposite sex?267
Sandel’s recognition of absolute moral goods also fails to
sufficiently guarantee minority rights. Although Sandel promoted an
argument for gay rights based on the similar moral good involved in
heterosexual and homosexual relationships,268 his approval of moral
decision-making in constitutional jurisprudence leaves the fate of
minorities dependent on the moral perspective of the presiding
judges.269 In the end, Sandel fails to suggest any basis for believing
judges would be more likely to share his moral perspective than the
voters and legislators who have, historically, often suppressed
minority interests.270
Both West and Ball recognized the potential for communitarian
ideas to enrich liberal claims. Ultimately, however, as West noted,
communitarian philosophy is an inadequate alternative to liberalism
for those concerned with advancing traditional liberal rights,
including the rights of minorities. Without some commitment to
rights, there can be no guaranteed basis for challenging dominant
community norms that conflict with the interests of minorities in
nondiscrimination or of all people in choosing how to conduct their
intimate lives. As West put it, “I am certain a commitment to
liberalism, universalism, and individualism is necessary to provide a
floor for these arguments; without such a commitment, there is just no
reason for these arguments to be heard, much less honored or
heeded.”271 Ball, in the final analysis, reached similar conclusions.272
Communitarian arguments are particularly salient in the context of
any discussion of the legal status of homosexuality in Africa because
of the deep communitarian roots of traditional cultures across the
continent. Although, as I have already discussed, African countries
have tended to adopt constitutions that proclaim liberal rights, many
266 Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 490–91 (citing Ronald
Dworkin & Michael Walzer, To Each His Own: An Exchange on Spheres of Justice, in
COMMUNITARIANISM: A NEW PUBLIC ETHICS, supra note 238, at 110, 112).
267 Id. at 503–04.
268 SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10, at 104.
269 Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 480–84 (discussing
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT, supra note 10, at 90–118).
270 Id. at 482.
271 West, supra note 148, at 711.
272 Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 512–13, 517.
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of the societies in which those constitutions have arisen have lacked
the profound cultural commitment to individualism that observers like
Sandel have noted in the United States. As a consequence,
communitarian values have frequently explained the actual operation
of law in African countries better than the putative liberal loyalties
evinced in African constitutions.
Countless authors have noted the communitarian leanings of
traditional cultures across the African continent.273 While African

273 See, e.g., T.W. Bennett, Comparative Law and African Customary Law, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 651 (Matthias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006) (stating that African customary law “emphasizes responsibility,
not rights and powers”); Chukwudum Okolo, The African Person: A Cultural Definition,
in AN INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 397 (P.H. Coetzee & MES van den Berg
eds., 1995) (asserting that in African culture, “[t]here is no question of rugged
individualism in outlook and life-style so characteristic of the European or the
American”); Ifianyi A. Menkiti, Person and Community in African Traditional Thought, in
AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 172 (R.A. Wright ed., 1984) (claiming that it
is “the community which defines the person as person, not some isolated static quality of
rationality, will, or memory . . .in the African understanding human community plays a
crucial role in the individual’s acquisition of full personhood”); LEOPOLD S. SENGHOR, ON
AFRICAN SOCIALISM 49, 93 (1964) (stating that “Negro-African society is collectivist or
. . . communal, because it is rather a communion of souls than an aggregate of individuals
. . . [N]egro-African society puts more stress on the group than on the individual, more on
solidarity than on the activity and needs of the individual, more on the communion of
persons than on their autonomy. Ours is a community society”); Kristen A. Dauphinais,
Training a Countervailing Elite: The Necessity of an Effective Lawyering Skills Pedagogy
for a Sustainable Rule of Law Revival in East Africa, 85 N.D. L. REV. 53, n.101 (2009)
(quoting Professor Adam Todd’s remarks on the communitarian nature of customary law
in East Africa); Lisa Forman, Justice and Justiciability: Advancing Solidarity and Justice
Through South Africans’ Right to Health Jurisprudence, 27 MED. & L. 661 (2008)
(asserting that the South African Supreme Court has developed a “novel rights paradigm
which locates individual civil and social rights within a communitarian framework
drawing from the traditional African notion of ‘ubuntu,’ denoting collective solidarity,
humaneness and mutual responsibilities . . . .”); Andrew Harris, Seymour Goodman &
Patrick Traynor, Mobile Money in Developing Countries: Financial Inclusion and
Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 245, 248 (noting that “a strong
communitarian strain exists throughout much of Africa”); Kelley, Slavery, supra note 219
(discussing the traditional communitarian approach to property ownership in Niger and the
web of mutual obligations individuals owe each other in general, making the Western
notion of individual freedom a foreign concept); Julie MacFarlane, Working Towards
Restorative Justice in Ethiopia:Integrating Traditional Conflict Resolution Systems With
the Formal Legal System, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 487, 502–03 (2007)
(describing a moderate form of communitarianism that exists within African societies,
involving a rejection of the Western concept of rights-based justice while nonetheless
leaving space for “individual challenge or even the rejection of some traditional values”);
Garth Mashmann, Book Review: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Intellectual Property
in the Twenty-First Century: Perspectives from Southern Africa, 19 SYRACUSE SCI. &
TECH. L. REP. 92, 95 (2008) (stating that communitarian values are “essential to African
concepts of ownership”); Adrien Wing, Communitarianism v. Individualism:
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cultures are, and always have been, extremely diverse, communitarian
tendencies have characterized a wide range of societies throughout
sub-Saharan Africa. Like communitarianism in the West, descriptions
of African communitarianism have tended to emphasize
responsibilities to community rather than individual rights.274
Many scholars have discussed the communitarian approach to
property ownership in African cultures.275 As Kelley observed, the
traditional notion that members of a community might have a range of
responsibilities for, and claims over, a single parcel of land has
spurred Western-inspired legal reforms to ensure alienability.276
Although liberal reforms might pave the way for economic
development, they also have the potential to alienate many individuals
who previously had been able to count on complex webs of mutual
responsibilities to ensure access to community resources.277 Similarly,
Western-style intellectual property laws conflict with communitarian
notions of shared cultural knowledge and, some have argued, may
lead to “debasement and trivialization” of artistic achievements,
which come to be judged as commodities rather than in terms of their
social value.278
Constitutionalism in Namibia and South Africa, 11 WIS. INT’L L.J. 295, 299 (1993)
(discussing the importance of communitarian values in South Africa and Namibia).
274 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 273, at 651; Okolo, supra note 273, at 397; Menkiti,
supra note 273, at 172; SENGHOR, supra note 273, at 49, 93; but see RICHARD H. BELL,
UNDERSTANDING AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY: A CROSS-CULTURAL APPROACH TO CLASSICAL
AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 62–63 (2002) (describing Kwame Gyekye’s vision of a
“moderate communitarianism,” which allows for some individual challenge to community
norms); KWAME GYEKYE, AN ESSAY ON AFRICAN PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT 160 (1995)
(arguing that, in Akan society, “if the common good is attained, then logically the
individual good is also attained. Strictly speaking, there can or should be no conflict
between the two, for the individual and the common goods are tied up together and
overlap. Therefore, any conflict stems from a misconception either of the common good,
of the individual good, or of the relationship between the two . . . [T]he concept of
communalism” does not operate “to the detriment of individuality. The concept of
communalism, as it is understood in Akan thought . . . does not overlook individual rights,
interests, desires, and responsibilities, nor does it imply the absorption of the individual
will into the communal will . . . .”).
275 See, e.g., Bennett, supra note 273, at 653–54 (claiming that in African traditional
societies, “duties arising out of social relationships” have priority over ideas of individual
ownership and that African customary law allows a range of interests in any piece of
property to vest in “various different holders”); Kelley, Slavery, supra note 219;
Mashmann, supra note 273.
276 Kelley, Slavery, supra note 219, at 1008.
277 Id.
278 Mashmann, supra note 273, at 95 (citing Pradip Thomas & Francis B. Nyamnjoh,
Intellectual Property Challenges in Africa: Indigenous Knowledge Systems and the Fate of
Connected Worlds, in ISAAC MAZONDE & PRADIP THOMAS, INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE
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Other authors have discussed the communitarian focus of
traditional African dispute resolution mechanisms. Writing in
sweeping terms of the influence of communitarian values in African
culture, Professor Jacques Frémont asserted that “[t]he first and
foremost value on the continent is the preservation of social peace
within the community.”279 T.W. Bennett has noted, likewise, that
traditional African dispute resolution is less likely to involve the use
of rules to declare one party the winner and one the loser, and more
likely to focus on compromise solutions to promote reconciliation.280
The focus on relationships, as opposed to rules or rights, poses
obvious challenges for liberal legal arguments.
Although African constitutions now tend to reflect the Western
focus on the individual as the most important actor in the political life
of the society, group imperatives have frequently driven political and
legal decision-making even in postcolonial Africa. Thus, despite
adopting constitutions that asserted liberal rights, many African
leaders in the years following independence relied on the idea of
group rights to economic development to justify mass subversion of
individual rights.281 Additionally, even today, in many African
nations, the liberal frameworks of formal state legal systems are much
less significant in the day-to-day lives of most people than traditional,
customary norms.282 To some extent, the continued vitality of
customary law in the lives of many Africans reflects a lack of
resources for the development of state justice systems, especially in
rural areas.283 The continued reliance on traditional norms also
reflects the formal recognition of customary law as governing various
spheres, like family relationships, in some countries.284
SYSTEMS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA 14, 23 (2007)).
279 Jacques Frémont, Legal Pluralism, Customary Law, and Human Rights in
Francophone African Countries, 40 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 149, 151 (2009).
280 Bennett, supra note 273, at 657.
281 See B.O. NWABUEZE, PRESIDENTIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 106–10
(1974); H. Kwasi Prempeh, Marbury in Africa: Judicial Review and the Challenge of
Constitutionalism in Contemporary Africa, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1239, 1266–68 (2006).
282 See, e.g., id. at 666–67; Kelley, Exporting Western Law, supra note 220, at 342–45.
283 See, e.g., Kelley, Exporting Western Law, supra note 220, at 342–45.
284 See, e.g., Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel, The Troubling Shortage of African Lawyers:
Examination of a Continental Crisis Using Zambia as a Case Study, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L.
719, 767–69 (2012). The Zambian Constitution’s nondiscrimination provision, for
example, is explicitly inapplicable “with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law” and “for the application
in the case of members of a particular race or tribe, of customary law with respect to any
matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the
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Perhaps the most prominent showcase of the enduring
communitarian propensities of African cultures is the African Charter
on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Unlike other regional human rights
documents, the Charter emphasizes group rights, both in its title and
in its content.285 Additionally, unlike most liberal human rights
documents, the Charter declares that individuals owe a range of
duties, including duties to “preserve the harmonious development of
the family;” “[t]o serve [the] national community by placing both
physical and intellectual abilities at its service;” “ . . . [t]o preserve
and strengthen social and national solidarity;” “[t]o preserve and
strengthen positive African cultural values . . . and, in general, to
contribute to the promotion of the moral well being of society;” to
“contribute to the best of [one’s] abilities . . . to the promotion and
achievement of African unity;”286 and to exercise all rights with due
regard for “morality and common interest.”287
Communitarian proclivities in cultures across Africa suggest the
likelihood that Africans will continue to be less sympathetic to liberal
arguments in favor of homosexual rights than even social
conservatives in the West, where the deep impact of liberalism on the
broader culture might lead many people to accept reforms protecting
homosexuals even if they believe homosexual conduct is immoral.
Additionally, African communitarianism suggests the likelihood of
pervasive popular backlash if Westerners succeed in pressuring
judges and political elites to adopt measures protecting homosexuals
in Africa. As I will discuss in the next section, the coincidence of
much of the African anthropological record with the anti-essentialist
claims of queer theorists helps explain why even Africans with
case of other persons.” CONST. OF ZAMBIA, art. 23(4). In many common law African
countries, legislative frameworks recognize the legitimacy of customary law so long as the
customary law “does not offend public policy, or any laws of a concerned country, or
natural justice, good conscience and equity.” Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda, African
Customary Law and Customs: Changes in the Culture of Sexual Cleansing of Widows and
the Marrying of a Deceased Brother’s Widow, 11 GONZ. J. INT’L L. 3 (2008), available at
http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/gjil/2008/02/african-customary-law/.
285 See, e.g., African Charter, art. 19 (stating that “[a]ll peoples shall be equal”); art.
20(1) (“All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the unquestionable
and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their political
status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy they
have freely chosen.”); art. 21(1) (“All peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and
natural resources.”); art. 22(1) (“All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social
and cultural development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal
enjoyment of the common heritage of mankind.”).
286 Id. art. 29 (alteration in original).
287 Id. art. 27.
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apparently strong liberal commitments are less likely than people with
Western notions of homosexuality to accept liberal arguments for gay
rights.
B. Queer Theory
Like communitarian ideology, the postmodernist philosophy of
queer theorists offers a counterpoint to liberalism that human rights
activists might do well to consider. This is particularly the case in
Africa, where the anti-essentialist claims of queer theorists arguably
coincide with much of the anthropological record.288 In their denial of
rights as a meaningful concept, both communitarianism and queer
theory pose broad challenges to the nondiscrimination and autonomy
pillars of liberalism. The anti-essentialist component of queer theory,
moreover, specifically complicates the nondiscrimination arguments
of homosexual rights advocates.
Before the latter part of the twentieth century, those who supported
homosexual rights tended to assume that homosexuality was naturally
occurring and independent of culture or social circumstance.289 In the
broader culture, during the period between the late nineteenth century
and the 1970s, writers on the subject alternated between describing
homosexuality as a psychological disorder afflicting a subset of the
population and as a “normal desire present in varying degrees in the
human population.”290 Heavily influenced by the work of Michel
Foucault, however, a new group of activists and academics began to
argue in the 1970s against the notion of a natural foundation for
sexual identity. Instead, according to these theorists, sexual identity is
socially contingent, a product of cultural influence rather than an
inevitable consequence of biology. Although queer theorists have
acknowledged the historical presence of sexual contact between
individuals of the same gender, they argue that homosexual identity
was a late nineteenth-century invention. Before 1870, according to

288 As chronicled by other authors, the cultural significance of same-sex intimacy in
cultures outside of Africa also suggests homosexual identity is socially constructed. See,
e.g., Katyal, supra note 14, at 99 (observing that “in India, to commit a homosexual act is
one thing; to be a homosexual is an entirely different phenomenon”).
289 Carlos A. Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy:
Liberalism Meets Queer Theory, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 271, 272 (2001) [hereinafter
Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy].
290 Steven Seidman, Deconstructing Queer Theory or the Under-Theorization of the
Social and the Ethical, in SOCIAL POSTMODERNISM: BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS 116,
119 (Linda Nicholson & Steven Seidman eds., 1995).
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Foucault, “the sodomite had been a temporary aberration,”291 a vice to
which all were susceptible.292 The idea of homosexuality then
emerged from scientific and medical discourses that purported to
assess same-sex sexual contact as characteristic of individuals
belonging to a stable category.293 With the development of this theory
of homosexuality, the transgressor had become a member of a
“species,” the homosexual.
For liberal homosexual rights advocates, the common notion of
homosexual identity as a naturally occurring, immutable attribute
bolsters arguments that homosexuals constitute a class deserving
protection against discrimination. If homosexual behavior is more
than simply a fleeting indiscretion, or a product of idiosyncratic taste,
and is instead a biological imperative for a discrete minority of the
population, then punishment of members of that minority for acting
consistently with that imperative, and with no direct third-party
impacts, becomes more difficult under a liberal paradigm.
Nonetheless, queer theorists have viewed this essentialist perspective
as an inadequate safeguard of the freedom of people who engage in
same-sex intimacies. Rather, these scholars contend, the insistence on
homosexual identity accepts the majority framework that classifies
the minority as fundamentally, irretrievably different, and then uses
that classification as a basis for oppression.294 For Steven Seidman,
the danger of attempts to normalize homosexuality, as opposed to
challenging the very concept, results in a “regime which perpetuates
the production of subjects and social worlds organized and regulated
by the heterosexual/homosexual binary.”295 In the African context, in
response to efforts to consolidate evidence of homosexuality in
African societies across the continent, Neville Hoad wrote of the risk
of “repeating the commonplaces of commonsense homophobia that
reduce gay and lesbian relationships to the template of heterosexual
coupledom.”296
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY 43 (1978).
Sigmund Freud advanced this notion in his assertion that “All human beings are
capable of making a homosexual object-choice and have in fact made one in their
unconscious.” Sigmund Freud, Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (quoted in HOAD,
supra note 44, at xvii) (citation omitted).
293 Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy, supra note 289, at
272.
294 See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of
Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER: EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267, 277 (Carole
S. Vance ed., 1984).
295 Seidman, supra note 290, at 126.
296 HOAD, supra note 44, at xxvi (discussing MURRARY & ROSCOE, supra note 54).
291
292
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For queer theorists, then, the acceptance of essentialist notions, or
of homosexual identity more broadly, is a double-edged sword.
Despite the liberal assertion of the potential for such an approach to
advance minority interests, the acceptance of categories often
imposed in the service of subjugation exposes the classified minority
to potential further abuse. This stance represents, for queer theorists,
part of a larger reaction to the identity politics of the civil rights and
feminist movements of the 1960s, which, for similar reasons, queer
theorists have viewed as insufficiently radical.297 Instead of accepting
models frequently used by majorities as tools of oppression, queer
theorists advocate deconstruction of those paradigms as a means of
achieving true liberation.298
For queer theorists like Michel Foucault and Ladelle McWhorter,
the means of resistance to dominant power structures has been the use
of self-transformative practices to escape socially imposed identities
that reinforce oppressive hierarchies. Foucault discussed the
transformative potential of the pursuit of “pleasure,” which he defined
in contrast to the idea of “desire,” a word that had been used by
medical and religious powers to classify, pathologize, and subjugate
those considered to have socially unacceptable proclivities and
passions. The idea of pleasure, on the other hand, was “virgin
territory,”299 and, as McWhorter would later note, not terribly
susceptible to quantification and measurement “in terms of
statistically manipulable developmental norms.”300 For Foucault,
sadomasochistic sex was an example of such a transformative
practice, for its potential to create “new possibilities of pleasure,
which people had no idea about previously” might confound attempts
to box its practitioners into predefined categories. McWhorter,
heavily influenced by Foucault, discussed the pursuit of pleasure
through self-transformative activities like gardening, country dancing,
and political engagement to advance the rights of homosexuals. For
McWhorter, as for Foucault, these practices can “increase the range
297

Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy, supra note 289, at

272.
298 As Ladelle McWhorter has suggested, there are “many ways in which our socially
and historically produced identities endanger us, make us vulnerable, and close us off from
possibilities. Identities often stand opposed to freedom.” LADELLE MCWHORTER, BODIES
AND PLEASURES: FOUCAULT AND THE POLITICS OF SEXUAL NORMALIZATION xix (1999);
see also Katyal, supra note 14, at 117–18.
299 David Halperin, SAINT FOUCAULT: TOWARDS A GAY HAGIOGRAPHY 215, 217
(quoting Foucault from, Le Gai Savoir, MEC, summer 1988); Ball, Essentialism and
Universalism in Gay Rights Philosophy, supra note 289, at 277.
300 MCWHORTER, supra note 298, at 184.
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within which we exercise our freedom and within which freedom
plays itself out beyond who we currently are.”301
As Ball has observed, this endorsement of political activity to
promote civil rights results, practically speaking, in an approach that
resembles liberal advocacy.302 What is clear from the above analysis,
however, is that the denial of the idea of homosexuality as a purely
socially constructed category ultimately complicates reliance on the
kinds of nondiscrimination arguments that could improve the lives of
people who might, under a liberal framework, be beneficiaries of such
claims. To the extent that evidence of African sexual practices and
attitudes coincides with the idea that homosexuality is not a stable
psychological or social category, African courts are less likely to
recognize the validity of nondiscrimination arguments.
The more sweeping challenge queer theory poses for liberal human
rights activists is similar to the communitarian denial of rights that
precede social context. Like communitarians, queer theorists deny the
possibility of rights as anything other than a cultural artifact. As Ball
has described this outlook, queer theorists do not stop with the denial
of homosexual identity as preceding social context. Rather, the antiessentialism of queer theorists “goes all the way down.”303 For queer
theorists, not only is group identity socially constructed, but there are
no essential, foundational components of human identity. Yet, if all
aspects of human identity are cultural constructions, the very idea of a
right to equality is undermined. Ultimately, “[i]t is what we all
(homosexuals, heterosexuals, bisexuals, and transgendered) share as
human beings that imposes on society moral. . .obligations to abide by
minimal standards of equality.”304 Similarly, queer theorists have
critiqued what they view as liberal “delusions of autonomy.”305
As I will discuss in detail below, the African anthropological
record has often tended to substantiate the narratives of queer
theorists. Although that record reveals patterns of same-sex intimacy
across a wide range of African cultures, it also demonstrates that these
intimacies often have manifested themselves as evanescent, socially
contingent phenomena, and the practitioners of these same-sex
intimacies have frequently assessed their same-sex sexual contacts as
insignificant parts of their identities. Of course, these data cannot, in
301
302
303
304
305

Id. at 182.
Ball, Essentialism and Universalism in Gay Rights Theory, supra note 289, at 283.
Id. at 283.
Id. (quoting MCWHORTER, supra note 298, at xvi).
MCWHORTER, supra note 298, at xvi.
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the end, answer the scientific question of the extent to which biology
drives sexual desire. They can, however, illuminate the different
cultural meanings of physical intimacies. While liberal, Western
observers would be likely to classify the practitioners of these samesex intimacies as members of a stable biological and/or social
category—homosexuals—that concept has, in fact, been foreign in
many African cultures. It would, moreover, be foreign even to many
of those whose lives human rights advocates hope to improve by
classifying them.
IV
ANTHROPOLOGICAL DATA
Narratives of the modern drive for homosexual identity and
homosexual rights in Africa often focus on Robert Mugabe’s
expulsion of Gays and Lesbians of Zimbabwe (GALZ) from the 1995
Zimbabwean Book Fair as the primary catalyst for the initiation of
contemporary discourse outside the South African context.306 Since
the book fair, both Mugabe and other African leaders have
characterized homosexuality as fundamentally un-African, a Western
disease, and a neocolonial construction.307 As discussed in Part II,
these ideas are currently widespread in African society, across
numerous countries and cultures. While it is tempting to dismiss such
claims as mere expressions of prejudice and xenophobia, this
reductive approach fails to account for the complex history of African
sexual identities, the depth of European influence on African culture
during the colonial era, and the modern integration and appropriation
of colonial ideology, rebranded as African tradition, in the service of
African nationalism.
In a meaningful but perhaps unintended and unrealized sense,
characterizations by African leaders of homosexuality as a Western
import have some factual basis, at least in many cultures. As
discussed above, even in the West, conceptions of same-sex sexual
intimacy as a defining emblem of personal and sexual identity
emerged only in the nineteenth century. Before that, neither those

EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at viii; HOAD, supra note 44, at xi.
See, e.g., EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at 4 (describing a Zimbabwean traditional
healer’s claim that white settlers invented the word “hungochani” to shame Africans “by
falsely making a ‘white man’s disease’ sound as if it were indigenous,” noting the Mugabe
government’s call for Zimbabwean patriots to “defend the nation against this new form of
Western imperialism,” and stating that the King of Swaziland, and presidents of Kenya,
Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia have similarly linked homosexuality to “external threats”).
306
307
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who engaged in transgressive sexual behavior nor society at large
imagined homosexuality as a discrete psychological, physiological, or
social category.
Similarly,
throughout
sub-Saharan
Africa,
although
anthropological evidence demonstrates geographically widespread
behavior that modern, Western observers would characterize as
homosexual, historical understandings of this behavior would
frequently have confounded contemporary constructions of
homosexual identity. Because most African societies were without
writing systems until the late nineteenth-century, accounts by
European explorers and missionaries offer the earliest available firsthand commentary on cultural practices throughout much of the subcontinent. These accounts included discussion of nonnormative
gender roles and transgressive sexual behavior in sub-Saharan African
cultures as early as the sixteenth century.308
Nonetheless, early discussions of African sexuality often promoted
the notion that sexual intimacy between members of the same sex was
unknown in sub-Saharan Africa. In 1781, in The Decline and Fall of
the Roman Empire, Edward Gibbon wrote, despite general European
unfamiliarity with most of the African interior, that he “believe[d],
and hope[d], that the negroes, in their own country, were exempt”
from the “moral pestilence” of sodomy.309 One hundred years later,
Richard Burton speculated on what he termed a Sotadic Zone, where
climate encouraged deviant sexual behavior. According to Burton’s
hypothesis, only Northern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa were
exempt from climatologically induced homosexuality.310
Authors have offered various explanations for such early theories
of African exceptionalism. Descriptions of same-sex sexual intimacy
as foreign to African cultures promoted the popular notion of Africa
as a site of premodern, primitive innocence.311 This vision of African
308 In the 1580s, an English prisoner of the Portuguese in Angola described indigenous
men who were “beastly in their living, for they have men in women’s apparel, whom they
keep among their wives.” In the 1640s, a Dutch attaché in Angola described Nzinga, the
female leader of Ndongo, an Mbundu kingdom, who dressed in men’s attire, styled herself
as king, and surrounded herself with a harem of young men dressed as women who were
considered her wives. In 1687, Father Antonio Cavazzi described the sexually ambiguous,
cross-dressing Ganga-Ya-Chibanda, presiding priest of the Imbangala of the Congo
region. MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54. In 1719, Peter Kolb wrote of Khoi-Khoin
males who had sexual relations with one another. Id. at 173.
309 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1776) 506
(quoted in MURRAY & ROSCOE at xii).
310 HOAD, supra note 44, at 10–11; MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at xii.
311 HOAD, supra note 44, at 4.
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culture dovetailed with fears in the metropole that sexual perversity,
including homosexuality, was a symptom of modernity.312
Additionally, these characterizations served the commercial
imperatives of the slave trade, which depended on depicting the
hyper-masculinity of the African male to market African bodies as a
means of production.313 In any case, the absence of African
homosexuality remained a dominant theme in European thought until
a new strand of scholarship, starting in the late 19th and early 20th
centuries, began to expose the range and complexity of African sexual
norms.314 Any thorough evaluation of contemporary claims by
African leaders that homosexuality is a foreign threat must take
measure of the Western origin of the idea that homosexual practices
were unknown in African societies.
These new narratives, however, catalogued same-sex intimacies
throughout the continent, describing a broad range of practices and
traditions. Although some of these descriptions validate contemporary
Western paradigms, they frequently contradict essentialist arguments
at the heart of much modern rights discourse. In his 1899 description
of homosexuality in Zanzibar, for example, Michael Haberlandt noted
two classes of men who engaged in homosexual sex. Some, whom the
local population considered uninterested in heterosexual relations by
God’s will (amri ya muungu) showed a lack of interest in women
from youth.315 This population, which Haberlandt described in
essentialist terms, was, according to him, congenitally homosexual.
Such “inborn contraries” were also tolerated, for as soon as their
relatives noticed their proclivities, “they reconcile[d] themselves
without further ado to this peculiarity.”316 On the other hand,
Haberlandt contrasted Zanzibar’s inborn contraries with the “acquired
contrariness” of the population of sex slaves, who were “kept away
from any work, well pampered, and systematically effeminized.”317
Id. at 5.
MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 12.
314 As late as 1985, respected anthropologist Michael Gelfand, describing the Shona of
Zimbabwe, asserted, “The traditional Shona seems to have none of the problems
associated with homosexuality. Obviously, they must have a valuable method of bringing
up children, especially with regard to normal sex relations, thus avoiding the anomaly so
frequent in Western society—yet another feature of their rich society.” EPPRECHT, supra
note 5, at 8 (quoting Michael Gelfand, Apparent Absence of Homosexuality and
Lesbianism in Traditional Zimbabweans, 31 CENT. AFR. J. OF MED. 137 (1985)).
315 Michael Haberlandt, Occurrences of Contrary-Sex Among the Negro Population of
Zanzibar, in MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 64.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 63–64.
312
313
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Although this population enjoyed “normal sex acts” in the early
stages of their socialization and would “remain normal if they
[weren’t] used for too long as catamites,” over the long term, they
would lose the capacity for erection and “find . . . pleasure only in
passive pederasty.”318
Haberlandt’s descriptions at once affirm the possibility of
essentialist claims, while also lending credence to social
constructionist theories, depending on which segment one selects
from the population he depicts. While Haberlandt delineates alternate
strains within the same population group (black Zanzibaris) other
observers of African cultures recorded behavioral patterns
problematic for anyone invested in an idea of homosexuality as an
organizing rubric for personal or sexual identity or as an essential,
immutable physiological imperative. While a comprehensive
accounting of the massive array of traditions throughout the continent
is untenable and unnecessary, an overview, including a range of
cultures, suggests the difficulty of any attempt to impose a
universalizing organizational structure onto same-sex African
intimacies.
Many authors have described the homosexual relationships they
observed in Africa as situational and evanescent. In Southern Africa,
anthropological accounts suggest contingent forms of same-sex
relationships were the predominant structure for homosexuality in
some cultures. In reporting on her fieldwork from the 1930s amongst
the Nyakyusa, a Bantu group northwest of Lake Malawi, Monica
Wilson observed that same-sex intimacy between adolescent boys
was both common and tolerated.319 Even so, these relationships
apparently seldom outlasted bachelorhood, and Wilson’s informants
contended that married Nyakyusa men invariably preferred
females.320 The few men who never married were “half-wits who
ha[d]no kind of intercourse at all.”321
Numerous authors have documented the common practice of
migrant miners in South Africa forming short-term same-sex
marriages. Perhaps most famously, T. Dunbar Moodie and Vivienne
Ndatshe catalogued the contours of these relationships in Going for
Gold: Men, Mines and Migration. In Moodie and Ndatshe’s account,
mine marriages reflected patterns of resistance to proletarianization
318
319
320
321

Id. at 64.
MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 174–75.
Id. at 175–76.
Id. at 176.
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by the men involved,322 many of whom had left wives behind in their
rural homelands. These men often resorted to mine marriages because
they considered women in the towns near the mines as threats to their
ambitions of returning eventually to establish households in their
ancestral communities.323 In his analysis of migrant labor in colonial
Zimbabwe, Charles van Onselen noted similar practices but drew
different conclusions about the political significance of the behaviors.
According to van Onselen, mining companies tolerated, if not
encouraged, prostitution, bestiality, and homosexuality amongst
African men,324 which helped “to secure a relatively docile labour
force with minimal expenditure on wages, social services, and urban
infrastructure—distracted and presumably demoralized by sexually
sordid affairs, the men were disabled from organizing effective
resistance against the appalling working and living conditions.”325 For
van Onselen, then, the proliferation of same-sex intimacy amongst
migrant mine workers represented a tool of racial capitalism, rather
than a method of resistance against it.
In 1900, Paolo Ambrogetti described the common practice of
young Eritrean boys having sexual relationships with older men.326
According to Ambrogetti, such relationships were considered only
minor transgressions, and the boys’ fathers often welcomed the
arrangements their sons made as a source of family income.327
Nonetheless, after the boys went through puberty, they usually ended
these affairs and began courting women.328 E.E. Evans-Pritchard
reported on the practices of the Azande, who live in parts of what are
now Sudan, Central African Republic, and the Congo. In describing
Azande lesbian practices, Evans-Pritchard noted that such
relationships were common in polygamous households in which a
woman might go for months without sharing her husband’s bed and in
which the seclusion of wives prevented heterosexual adultery.329 The
predominant form of male same-sex intimacy occurred between
322 T. DUNBAR MOODIE & VIVIENNE NDATSHE, GOING FOR GOLD: MEN, MINES, AND
MIGRATION 120 (1994).
323 Id. at 135–36.
324 CHARLES VAN ONSELEN, CHIBARO: AFRICAN MINE LABOUR IN SOUTHERN
RHODESIA, 1900–33, 175–76 (1976).
325 EPPRECHT, supra note 5, at 9 (quoting VAN ONSELEN, supra note 324).
326 MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 21–22.
327 Id. at 21.
328 Id.
329 E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Sexual Inversion Among the Azande, 72 AM.
ANTHROPOLOGIST 1428, 1429, 1431–32 (1970) (quoted in MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra
note 54, at 28–29).
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warriors and their boy-wives—between the ages of twelve and
twenty—and Evans-Pritchard attributed the acceptance of such
marriages to the difficulty for Azande warriors of obtaining
satisfaction in heterosexual marriages; presumably, heterosexual
arrangements would have been particularly problematic when war
broke out, but warriors were able to take their boy-wives with them.
With the dissolution of the military companies and royal court in
post-European times, as marriage between men and women became
easier, Pritchard noted, boy-marriage disappeared.330
In West Africa, the Mossi, in contemporary Burkina Faso, like the
Eritreans and the Azande, engaged in age-defined same-sex
relationships. Mossi chiefs would choose pages from the most
attractive boys between ages seven and fifteen.331 These pages dressed
as women and engaged in sexual practices with the chiefs,
particularly on Fridays, when Mossi tradition forbade sex with
women.332 Once pages matured, however, they took female wives.333
Today, even in African cultures in which people tend to engage in
same-sex intimacies throughout their lives, participants are often
unlikely to identify themselves as homosexuals or to prioritize samesex intimacy over heterosexual marriage. Amongst the Hausa in
Kano, Nigeria, for example, although men who engage in same-sex
intimacies consider their desires to be inborn and immutable, these
men also consider same-sex intimacy primarily as a form of play, and
as secondary in importance to reproductive obligations in
heterosexual marriage.334 Similarly, in Nii Ajen’s survey of West
African homosexuality, the author emphasized that West African men
who have sex with men also tend to have heterosexual relationships
and marriages, and such men commonly reject any suggestion of gay
identity, which simply does not have cultural resonance for them.335
Other accounts have also noted that, throughout West Africa, only a
small percentage of men who engage in same-sex intimacy identify
themselves as being gay, and “[s]ex between men is not automatically

Id.
MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 91.
332 Id. at 91–92.
333 Id. at 92.
334 Rudolph P. Gaudio, Male Lesbians and Other Queer Notions in Hausa, in MURRAY
& ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 121.
335 Nii Ajen, West African Homoeroticism: West African Men Who Have Sex with Men,
in MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 133–34.
330
331
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labeled as homosexual behavior.”336 In South Africa as well, many
men who engage in same-sex sexual practices reject homosexual
identity as un-African and as a Western construct.337
In some cases, imposition of Western sexual paradigms onto
African societies has entailed mischaracterization of cultural practices
that likely involve no sexual intimacy at all. For example, Nigerian
sociologist Ifi Amadiume has noted that Western attempts to label as
lesbian the woman-to-woman marriages that take place in some West
African societies would be “shocking and offensive to Nnobi women,
since the strong bonds and support between them do not imply lesbian
sexual practices.”338 Amadiume has argued that such characterizations
impose Western prejudices onto African material as a means of
justifying “choices of sexual alternatives which have roots and
meaning in the West.339
Some accounts offer potential validation for essentialist claims, and
such validation is even possible from close reading of some of the
same commentaries that seem to undermine the essentialist paradigm.
In Ambrogetti’s description of the fleeting relationships of prepubescent Eritreans with older men, for example, one notes that
although the boys apparently grew out of these relationships after
adolescence and began to pursue women, the very fact that there were
older men who offered a demand for such affairs suggests a less
contingent form of desire for same-sex intimacy in a segment of the
population; presumably these men also had wives and families.
Although Evans-Pritchard described Azande homosexuality as
common when women were unavailable, he also noted that some
princes slept with boys “just because they like them,”340 and that some
men married boys even when they also had female wives.341
There are several reasons to read these colonial accounts with
suspicion, whatever the conclusions of their authors. First, the
realities these writers perceived necessarily reflected the tropes that
336 MATTHEW W. ROBERTS, EMERGENCE OF GAY IDENTITY AND GAY SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE AIDS CRISIS AS CATALYST, 20
ALTERNATIVES 247 (1995).
337 K Rebe et al., Towards “Men Who Have Sex With Men-Appropriate” Health
Services in South Africa, SOUTHERN AFRICAN HIV CLINICIANS SOCIETY,
http://www.sahivsoc.org/Articles/MSM.
338 IFI AMADIUME, MALE DAUGHTERS, FEMALE HUSBANDS: GENDER AND SEX IN
AFRICAN SOCIETY 7 (1987).
339 Id.
340 E.E. EVANS-PRITCHARD, THE AZANDE 183 (1971).
341 Evans-Pritchard, Sexual Inversion Among the Azande, supra note 329, at 1431
(quoted in MURRAY & ROSCOE, supra note 54, at 26).
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shaped their expectations. Second, colonial writers could, by
definition, observe African cultures only after exposure of those
cultures to the potential influence of contact with the outside world;
this fact necessarily complicates any attempt to identify “authentic”
tradition.
Ultimately, no anthropological account can answer the question of
whether, as liberal essentialists typically argue, homosexuality is a
product of an immutable biological imperative, or, alternatively, a
consequence only of social construction. What these reports can
convey, however, is the significance individuals in various cultures
ascribe to their desires. If in many cultures, practitioners of same-sex
intimacies define those practices in terms that are incongruous with
Western conceptions of homosexuality, whose agenda is served, one
might ask, by insisting on classifying the foreign custom in Western
terms?
In the end, whether the underlying basis for the conduct Westerners
refer to as homosexual is biological or cultural, the anthropological
evidence suggesting primarily contingent forms of same-sex intimacy
in some African cultures, and the disinclination of even those who
engage in lifelong homosexual intimacies in others to organize their
identities around those relationships or desires, are significant
obstacles to liberal homosexual rights advocates. At the very least, a
survey of the historical reports of same-sex intimacies in African
cultures complicates the assertions of anyone invested in pursuing a
homosexual rights agenda based on Western conceptions of
homosexuality as an essential, immutable characteristic, as primarily
involving relationships between legal peers, and as a principal marker
of psychic, social, or political identity.
Of course, as any careful reader will have noticed, this is not the
end of the story. The very presence of groups like GALZ in
Zimbabwe suggests that whatever the culture in Zimbabwe once was,
there clearly are now Zimbabweans who precisely fit the mold of the
Western homosexual. Likewise, homosexual advocacy and the
limited presence of community groups in other countries demonstrate
that today, there are African homosexuals across the continent.342

342 See, e.g., Ghoshal, supra note 25 (describing a “thriving community center” for
members of the LGBTI community in Burundi); Gay and Lesbian Coalition of Kenya,
http://galck.org; Sexual Minorities Uganda, http://www.smug.4t.com.
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V
THE WAY FORWARD
Given the forgoing analysis, what is a well-intentioned Western
liberal concerned about protecting people who engage in same-sex
intimacies in Africa to do? There are no easy answers to that question.
Without doubt, African laws and attitudes toward homosexuality have
had devastating consequences for some practitioners of same-sex
intimacies on the continent. On the other hand, liberal human rights
advocates would do well to recall Kelley’s admonition about the
potential for liberal reforms in the developing world to go wrong. It is
easy to imagine the possibility that Western pressure for homosexual
rights in Africa might have negative, unintended repercussions. An
understanding of communitarian philosophy, queer theory, and
evidence of cultural beliefs and practices from across Africa
facilitates comprehension of that potential. Given the focus on group
values over individual rights in many African cultures, Western
pressure may incite deeper political backlash than one might expect in
a society with a more ingrained cultural commitment to the atomistic
individual at the center of liberal ideology. This backlash could
further endanger Africans who engage in same-sex sexual practices.
Compounding the problem, the liberal insistence on classifying
Africans who practice same-sex intimacies as homosexuals, even
though many of the intended beneficiaries of that classification have
not thought of themselves in such terms, could make Africans who
have same-sex sexual experiences easier targets for violence and
persecution.
Some observers have already noted backlash against Western
pressure for homosexual rights in Africa. In the wake of Obama’s
declaration that federal agencies should promote homosexual rights in
foreign countries, and David Cameron’s threat to cut British aid to
nations that criminalize homosexual conduct, some African countries
that had largely ignored homosexuality reacted by focusing
significant negative attention on the issue for the first time. In Liberia,
for example, although sodomy had been a misdemeanor punishable
by up to a year in prison, there had been no prosecutions under the
law in the years leading up to the American announcement.343 That
proclamation, however, incited a wave of Liberian denunciations of
homosexuality, and in its wake, Liberian legislators introduced bills
to make same-sex sexual practices and homosexual marriage
343

Corey-Boulet, supra note 65.
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felonies.344 Likewise, the International Gay Bisexual Trans and
Intersex Association noted in 2013 that “diplomatic ties of aid to ‘gay
rights’ by western allies to African countries have perpetuated greater
homophobia in Africa with ‘gays’ being viewed as the stumbling
block to access public welfare funding for health, education, shelter
and other basic public amenities tied to western funding.”345
The damaging potential of political backlash to anti-majoritarian
legal reform has been noted in the West as well. In the United States,
Professor Michael Klarman has argued that, in the short term, Brown
v. Board of Education generated harmful backlash that reversed the
progress of social reform movements that had increased black
suffrage and integration in universities and sports competitions in the
South in the years leading up to the decision.346 Likewise, Roe v.
Wade may have fostered the development of America’s right-to-life
movement, altering the contours of American political discourse and
making abortion reform more difficult. Supreme Court Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has endorsed this view, arguing that Roe’s shortcircuiting of the political process led to enduring conservative
resistance to abortion.347 In the context of gay rights, Klarman noted
that cases like Lawrence, and the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s
decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health that
homosexuals have a right to marry, inspired states that had not
previously considered the issue to amend their constitutions to ban
gay marriage and mobilized conservative resistance to homosexual
rights.348
By 2013, Klarman had concluded that massive resistance to a
broad ruling that homosexuals have a right to marry would be
unlikely.349 He noted that public opinion had shifted on the matter and

344 Id. Others have noted similar backlash to Western calls for homosexual rights in
countries outside Africa. See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 14, at 139 (stating, in the course of
arguing that Western constructions of homosexual identity leave out sexual minorities who
fall outside the dominant paradigm, that “as the global gay rights movement takes hold in
Thailand, the military, police, and other state leaders have increasingly targeted
transgendered persons due to their visibility”).
345 ITABORAHY & ZHU, supra note 15, at 38.
346 Klarman, Brown and Lawrence, supra note 204, at 454.
347 Bazelon, supra note 205.
348 Klarman, Brown and Lawrence, supra note 204, at 466.
349 Michael Klarman, A Gay Marriage Backlash? Not Likely, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/24/opinion/la-oe-klarman-scotus-and-gay
-marriage-20130324/2; Michael Klarman, Marriage Equality and Political Backlash, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/26/civil-rights
-decisions-in-courts-or-legislatures/marriage-equality-and-political-backlash.
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that, unlike segregation, a marriage equality ruling would not have
any significant, direct impact on the lives of opponents.350 Moreover,
unlike the potential to subvert integration through the continued
power of local officials to assign students to schools after Brown, or
to subvert abortion rights by imposing oppressive regulations on
clinics, there would be little opportunity to undermine a broad
marriage equality ruling.351 Public opinion in Africa, however, has not
shifted dramatically in favor of homosexual rights.352 Additionally,
backlash to counter-majoritarian gay rights reform could be both
more virulent and more sustained in cultures that lack the West’s
entrenched cultural commitment to individual rights. In the United
States, for example, the almost reflexive dedication to individual
choice may lead many of those who strongly disapprove of
homosexual conduct to conclude that such conduct must be tolerated
nonetheless. Members of societies in which liberal legal commitments
reflect the choices of political elites, rather than mirroring widespread
cultural attitudes, might come to different conclusions.
Backlash to Western pressure might take many forms. It could
mean disorganized, random acts of violence against people perceived
to be homosexuals. It could mean legislative measures that increase
penalties for homosexual behavior, as in Liberia, or that criminalize
homosexual conduct for the first time. If human rights groups
successfully petition courts for decisions protecting homosexual
rights, or if opponents fear they might, it could mean constitutional
amendments that entrench discrimination against practitioners of
same-sex intimacies. In Zambia, this possibility seems likely to come
to fruition, as the convention drafting the Fourth Republican
Constitution has recommended provisions on “anti-social behavior”
to preclude the possibility that homosexuals might use fundamental
rights provisions to support court claims.353

Id.
Id.
352 A recent report by the Pew Research Center, including data from eight African
countries, showed that majorities in all eight countries believe homosexuality should not
be accepted. Significantly, this included South Africa, where the constitution explicitly
protects homosexuals from discrimination, and where the Supreme Court ruled in 2005
that homosexuals have a right to same-sex marriage. Drew DeSilver, A Global Snapshot of
Same-Sex Marriage, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (June 4, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org
/fact-tank/2013/06/04/global-snapshot-sex-marriage/.
353 Charles Sakala, New Zambian Constitution to Ban Homosexuality, ZAMBIA
REPORTS, Apr. 15, 2013, http://zambiareports.com/2013/04/15/new-zambian-constitution
-to-ban-homesexuality/.
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Klarman identified three likely reasons for backlash to countermajoritarian court decisions in the United States: such decisions
increase the salience of the issue; anger over outside interference; and
alteration of the order in which social change would have occurred in
the absence of interference.354 Each of these considerations is
certainly significant to any calculation of the likely depth of resistance
to efforts by Western human rights advocates to advance homosexual
rights in Africa. In Africa, however, Western stimulus has increased
the salience of homosexuality in a way that goes beyond merely
focusing a spotlight on an issue that many had previously ignored. It
has also had a creative impact on the African imagination, generating
a social category that in many societies had never existed.
When leaders like Mugabe suggest that Western influence is
responsible for the spread of homosexuality in Africa, they are likely
correct, although in an unintended in sense; people in Africa have
always engaged in same-sex intimacies, but the presence in
contemporary African cultures of some people who define those
intimacies in terms congruous with modern conceptions of
homosexuality may indeed be the consequence of Western
influence.355 On the other hand, no culture is static. Today, there are
some Africans who conceive of themselves as homosexuals in a sense
that would be familiar in the West, and these people also have a claim
to a place in the various African cultures of which they are a part.
Still, other Africans who have same-sex sexual contacts continue to
resist homosexual identity. Westerners who insist on classifying all
Africans who engage in same-sex intimacies as homosexuals—
despite the inconsistency of that classification with the visions many
of its intended beneficiaries have of their own lives—may expose the
people they hope to assist to greater hostility and oppression than they
had faced before.
Even for Africans who identify themselves as homosexuals,
coercive pressure from the West might not be the best solution. As
other authors have observed, the liberal myth that American
homosexuals were unable to lead satisfying lives before the Stonewall

Klarman, Brown and Lawrence, supra note 204, at 473.
As Neville Hoad has observed, gay culture, “like Coca-Cola, Madonna, and Calvin
Klein underwear, has become a potent American export.” Neville Hoad, Between the
White Man’s Burden and the White Man’s Disease, 5 GAY & LESBIAN Q. 559, 563 (1999);
see also Katyal, supra note 14.
354
355
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riots of 1969 sparked the gay rights movement belies reality.356
Instead, long before Stonewall, American homosexuals successfully
formed communities that provided some measure of camaraderie,
freedom, and insulation against the hostility of the outside world.357
Similarly, even in the absence of laws protecting homosexual rights in
Africa, African homosexuals have formed communities that offer
friendship, emotional support, and solace. It is entirely conceivable
that pressure from Western rights advocates might incite reactions
that could harm those communities and stymie possibilities for slow
progress toward greater acceptance.358
Cultural dynamism also cuts both ways. Pointing out the presence
of some modern African homosexuals is a reasonable response to
anthropological narratives that suggest primarily contingent forms of
same-sex intimacy in Africa. If that is the case, however, it makes
little sense to emphasize that outsiders originally introduced Africa’s
356 See, e.g., Ball, Communitarianism and Gay Rights, supra note 69, at 469
(discussing GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND THE
MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890–1940 (1994)).
357 Id.
358 As Zambian Vice President Guy Scott recently argued, somewhat inartfully,
“There’s tonnes of gay joints in this town. Well, not tonnes but they’re there, well known.
It’s entirely the same phenomenon you get anywhere else. It’s live and let live. Stirring up
and making it worse, that is the biggest danger. Let sleeping dogs lie is an easier policy.”
David Smith, Zambian Vice-President: ‘South Africans Are Backward,’ THE GUARDIAN
(May 1, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/01/zambian-vicepresident
-south-africans-backward. Vice President Scott’s statement fails to account for the fact that
for at least some Zambian homosexuals, it is not “live and let live.” In recent months, for
example, the prosecution of two alleged homosexuals from the Zambian town of Kapiri
Mposhi has attracted regular headlines in the country and internationally. See, e.g.,
Zambian Men Charged Over Gay Sex, BBC (May 8, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news
/world-africa-22451632. Additionally, gay rights activist Paul Kasonkamona was arrested
in April of 2013 for advocating for homosexual rights on Zambian television. Obert
Simwanza, Zambia’s Gay Rights Cases Raise Concerns Over Nation’s Growing
Intolerance, AFP, June 4, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/05/zambia-gay
-rights-cases-_n_3385441.html. Yet these two cases were the only prosecutions for
homosexuality in Zambia’s recent history, amid what Agence France Press referred to as
an “increasingly anti-gay climate.” Id. Similarly, despite the international attention
Uganda’s proposals for harsh penalties for homosexual conduct have attracted, Uganda’s
current sodomy laws are enforced so rarely that members of Uganda’s homosexual
community have suggested contesting the laws is not a priority. Hollander, supra note 20,
at 221. There have been some moderate signs of increasing tolerance toward
homosexuality in some African countries in recent years. Despite the retention of sodomy
laws in Botswana and Mauritius, for example, both countries have recently banned
employment discrimination based on sexual orientation. Ghoshal, supra note 25. In 2012,
Malawian President Joyce Banda suspended enforcement of the country’s sodomy laws.
Godfrey Mapondera, Malawi Suspends Anti-Gay Laws as MPs Debate Repeal, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/05/malawi-gay
-laws-debate-repeal.
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anti-sodomy laws and the Muslim and Christian ideology that
continue to inspire African intolerance for homosexuality. Those
laws, and that ideology, helped transform African cultures into what
they are today and are now as much a part of those cultures as older,
pre-colonial traditions that have been frequently transformed and
sometimes forgotten. Western attempts to disparage African attitudes
by denying agency to those who express them echo colonial
discourses and fit perfectly the historical pattern of distinguishing
colonized populations as failing to meet minimum criteria for access
to the full range of liberal rights. This condescending approach to
human rights advocacy is likely to generate further resistance.
In the final analysis, the best way for Westerners to improve the
lives of practitioners of same-sex intimacies in Africa might be to step
back from the front lines. Complete disengagement from a human
rights crisis may be impossible for those with liberal philosophical
commitments, and total abandonment of the issue is not desirable.
Ultimately, the liberal insistence on the existence of universal rights
provides better protection to marginalized minorities than the
liberating potential of postmodernist deconstruction of identity or
emphasis on the benefits of community; denial of the existence of
rights as anything more than a reflection of the power relations and
values of the particular communities in which such claims arise
severely diminishes arguments for taking minority interests seriously.
Yet even without direct attempts by Westerners to shape African law,
the inexorable influence of Western culture and the independently
evolving attitudes of members of African cultures may lead
eventually toward greater acceptance of homosexuality in Africa. A
more modest approach may also benefit the large numbers of Africans
who have intimate contacts with people of the same sex but who do
not consider themselves homosexuals, many of whom have likely
faced negative consequences from the rising salience of
homosexuality in Africa and the association of homosexual rights
advocacy with cultural imperialism. In any case, direct engagement
by Westerners in a battle for homosexual rights in Africa might well
do more harm than good. There will always be struggles within every
society to define the past in order to shape the present and influence
the future. When strangers with little understanding of the context for
those struggles attempt to affect their outcomes, they tend to face
unintended and, at times, deeply undesirable consequences. There is
no simple solution, but if liberals hope to have a positive impact on
the lives of people who engage in same-sex intimacies in Africa, we
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should structure our interactions with the cultures we hope to
influence as conversations rather than as lectures or commands.

